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T

he UN Charter reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a
political system to govern conflicts between states. It does not
directly address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in
the post-World War II period. The drafters did not contemplate the
existence of international terrorists nor their tenacity and access to
technology. In view of the fact that terrorist groups appear to have
reached a global sophistication, there is little doubt that international
terrorism presents a threat with which traditional theories for the use of
military force are inadequate to deal with, and were not contemplated
when the UN Charter was drafted. This Article is premised on the theme
that the right to self-defence is enrolled in a process of change. The focal
point of state practice in the Article is the United States, which has long
sought to articu late, through official policy, use of force as a counterterrorism measure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The senseless mayhem of World War I—the destruction of economic
structures, dissipation of financial resources, and undermining of
political stability—wiped the gloss from the traditional notion of war as a
rational political act. The war was disastrous to both its initiators and
victims. Millions died pointlessly and whole regimes fell. The carnage
forced modern industrial societies to question war as an instrument of
national policy; where the benefits of conquest (a major incentive in
previous centuries) seemed trivial by comparison with the costs of war—
large scale death and destruction, political instability and economic
turmoil for all involved—it seemed obvious that war was no longer a
profitable enterprise.
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In response to the destruction of World War I, the League of Nations
formed as an international organization to usher in collective security and
replace a centuries old militaristic balance of power, and was an
ambitious move to curb sovereign military excesses and guarantee world
peace. However, it was during the League’s chequered existence that two
issues of significance fell on the international agenda—terrorism and the
limitation of the use of military force. With the formation of the League
of Nations, and renewed efforts to prevent future violence, the freedom
of states to resort to military force became more and more restricted,
while the right of self-defence gained in significance, displacing the
expansive right of self-preservation.
One of the League’s most significant efforts was the creation and
adoption of the International Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928.1 The
Pact prohibited war as an instrument of national policy and recognized
the right of self-defence as a legal right, thus tacitly excluding other
previously accepted forms of self-help as avenues legitimating the use of
military force.2
1. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
art. 1, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1928, 46 U.S.T. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into
force July 24, 1929) [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. By the time it entered into force,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been signed and ratified/acceded to by a total of 59 States
(including all the States (major and minor) that were subsequently to comprise the Axis
Powers), almost all the States comprising the international community at that time.
2. Kellogg-Briand Pact states:
[P]ersuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and
friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought
only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and
that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national
interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this
Treaty . . .
Have decided to conclude a Treaty;
Article I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy
in their relations with one another.
Article II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of
all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
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Despite these efforts, the Kellogg-Briand Pact had its shortcomings.
The prohibition of war, for instance, failed to be linked to a system of
sanctions. Its preamble simply declared that a state violating the Pact
“should be denied the benefits furnished by the Treaty.” An even more
serious deficiency was the Pact’s failure to outlaw the use of force in
general, as well as war. The Pact was eventually ratified by 62 states, and
made an exception for self-defence, but failed to define it—with the
result that the customary criteria set out in the Caroline case remained
the only legal bases for the use of force in international affairs. Strong on
principle but lacking an enforcement mechanism, the Pact was doomed
to have little practical effect,3 and the League of Nations’ authority was
challenged and whittled by a series of aggressive acts carried out by
some of the then major powers (Japan, Italy and a resurgent Germany)
during the mid- to late 1930s. The League’s utility was finally terminated
by the outbreak of World War II in 1939.4
It was only after the destruction of World War II that the UN, the UN
Charter, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established.5 The
Id.
3. The pact never made a meaningful contribution to international order, although it
was invoked in 1929 with some success, when China and the U.S.S.R. reached a tense
moment over possession of the Chinese Eastern R.R. in Manchuria. Ultimately, however,
the pact proved to be meaningless, especially with the practice of waging undeclared
wars in the 1930s (e.g., the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion
of Ethiopia in 1935, and the German occupation of Austria in 1938). See generally
ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME 260 (Lewis P. Curtis ed., Yale Univ. Press
1952) (1968) .
4. In 1945, six years after the start of World War II, the Axis Powers were on the verge
of total defeat and one of the blackest pages in human history about to close. By May
1945, Hitler’s envisaged Thousand-Year Reich lay in ruins. By August, Japan was
devastated, as the atomic bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
destroyed Japan’s receding hope of carrying on its war of conquest. World War II was the
most cruel and devastating conflict in history. In terms of lives lost, geographical extent, and
cities reduced to ashes, the struggle defies rational comprehension. Over 17 million
combatants were killed, 27 million wounded and nearly 20 million captured or missing.
Civilian populations were more affected by this war than any other in the past. JACKSON
NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FROM
WORLD WAR I TO THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2004).
5. The final step in making the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) was taken at
Yalta, in 1945, by the “Big Three” (the U.S., the U.K. and Russia) with victory in sight.
All the Allied States, great and small, were invited to the United Nations Conference on
International Organization, which met in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to prepare the
final instrument for the new international organization. LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD
HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4–8 (3d ed.
1969).
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primary purpose of the new organization was “to maintain international
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”6
Until the adoption of the UN Charter, there had been no customary
prohibition on the unilateral resort to force if circumstances warranted it,
and in many instruments states reserved the right to resort to force. While
customary international law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation,
and retribution as legitimate responses, the UN sought to impose
limitations on the unilateral use of force in resolving international
disputes. Under the UN Charter the right of self-defence was the only
included exception to the prohibition of the use of force.7
Thus, the UN Charter introduced to international politics a radically
new notion: a general prohibition of the unilateral resort to force by
states,8 as encapsulated in its most authoritative form in Article 2(4). The
UN Charter identified the structural defect of the international political
system and created a network of institutions and procedures. Rather than
standing by itself, Article 2(4) was part and parcel of a complex security
system.9 Under the UN Charter, unilateral acts of force not characterized
as self-defence, regardless of motive, were made illegal.10 Individual or
collective self-defence became the cornerstone relating to use of force,
and, since then, has been invoked with regard to almost every use of
external military force.11

6. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. The “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals” were taken as
the basis for the discussions that were to lead to the UN Charter.
7. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
8. Various legal instruments have reinforced the prohibition of the use of force since
the adoption of the UN Charter. These include: Article 5 of the Pact of the Arab League,
reaffirmed by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio de
Janeiro on September 2, 1947; Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogota
Charter), article 5 condemns aggression, article 15 forbids intervention, and article 18
cites no use of force except in self defence; the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence
(known as Pancha Sila), first formulated in April 29, 1954 between India and the PRC;
the final communiqué of the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung of April 24, 1955 which
gave approval to ten principles as the basis for promotion of world peace and
cooperation. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Principles_of_Peaceful_Coexistence;
http://en/wikipedia.org/ wiki/Bandung_Conference (last visted Feb. 17, 2006).
9. The Charter included provisions for collective and regional defence arrangements,
and provisions on self defence.
10. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39–51.
11. See Jackson Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror and the
Notion of Anticipating the Enemy, 51 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).

2006]

WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW TIGHTROPE

5

However, during the Cold War, it was increasingly clear that terrorists
were using technology to “exploit the vulnerabilities of modern
societies.”12 With citizens tending to live, work, and travel in close
proximity providing concentrated targets, modern societies are
particularly susceptible to large-scale attacks and weapons of mass
destruction.13 This fact was not lost on perpetrators of terrorism, as
witnessed by its growing capabilities and lethalness throughout the Cold
War era.14 The United States and Israel led the way in seeking to co-opt
use of military force as a countermeasure against terrorism. The stance of
the United States of “passive, reactive and patient defense” to terrorism
in the early 1970s shifted to a “no compromise and very proactive
approach” in the early 1980s, encapsulated in the “Reagan” and “Shultz
Doctrines.”15 Subsequent U.S. presidents have relied on a similar tenet of
swift, effective retribution to counter terrorism, often wrapping it up
together with the right of anticipatory self-defence.
Though terrorism has always been high on the international agenda, it
was the attacks on September 11, 2001 that brought the issue of terrorism
and the international regime on the use of force into a new, urgent, and
sustained debate. The magnitude of the September 11th attacks went
beyond terrorism as it was known, and statements from various capitals
around the world pointed to a need to develop new strategies to confront
a new reality. The attacks had seemingly generated the momentum for
the international legal system to formally co-opt military response to
counter-terrorism within the regime of lawful force contained in the UN
Charter.
The Bush administration prepared the ground for pre-emptive attacks
by seeking to engage the accepted right of self-defence as a justification
for military action against rogue states. Because of the new threats, the
United States claimed, a proper understanding of the right of self-defence
should now extend to authorizing pre-emptive attacks against potential
aggressors, cutting them off before they would be able to launch strikes

12. Id. at 4.
13. JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 4 (1999).
14. Id. at 6 (stating that between 1970 and 1995, on average, each year brought 206
more incidents and 441 more fatalities).
15. Shirlyce Manning, The United States’ Response to International Air Safety, 61 J.
AIR L. & COM. 505, 519 (1996); see Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western
Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM 307, 316 (Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid eds., 1993).
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that might be devastating in their scale and scope.16 This aggressive
approach became a central tenet of the United States’ strategic posture
known as the “Bush Doctrine.”17 Like the aggressive national policies
before it, the “Bush Doctrine” seeks to “effectively clos[e] down
dangerous regimes before they become imminent threats”18 and, thus,
represents a usurpation of the Security Council’ s role in global affairs.
This Article commences with an overview of the UN Charter regime
on the use of military force. It then proceeds to tackle its central theme
—an examination of the genesis of the current U.S. policy of proactive
action through military force to counter terrorism. Overall, the Article is
premised on the theme that the right to self-defence is visibly enrolled in
a process of change and evaluates this process within the uncertain and
indeterminate framework of state practice and the legal regime
articulated in the UN Charter. The focal point of state practice in the
Article is the United States, which has long sought to articulate, through
official policy, use of force as a counter-terrorism measure. Though a
handful of states (especially Israel) have treaded this path, it is the United
States that has sought to articulate it as part of government policy.

16. The U.S. government’s position is encapsulated in the West Point
Commencement Address on June 1, 2002 and officially articulated in the National
Security Strategy, released in September 2002. See George W. Bush, West Point
Commencement
Address
(June
1,
2002)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200220601-3.html) (announcing an
expansive new policy of preemptive military action); THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf
[hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
17. The “Bush Doctrine” is the term that is now widely used by journalists, scholars
and politicians alike to describe the pre-emption strategy championed by Paul Wolfowitz,
Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy. See Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors,
Chronology:
The
Evolution
of
the
Bush
Doctrine,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html
(“Wolfowitz’s
‘Defense Planning Guidance’ draft argue[d] for a new military and political strategy in a
post-Cold War world. Containment, it says, is a relic of the Cold War. America should
talk loudly, carry a big stick, and use its military power to preempt the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (‘WMD’)”).
18. Anthony Dworkin, Introduction, Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive SelfOF
WAR
PROJECT,
June
1,
2004,
Defense,
CRIMES
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-intro.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). See also
Eyal Benvenisti, Expert Analysis, Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive SelfOF
WAR
PROJECT,
June
1,
2004,
Defense,
CRIMES
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-benvenisti.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
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II. USE OF FORCE AND THE UN CHARTER
Despite a general prohibition of force, the UN Charter recognizes that
force may be necessary to restore order, and that states are entitled to
defend themselves against aggression.19 This right is “inherent,” and
customary international law is the yardstick upon which the degree and
manner of self-help should be measured.20 In the face of the UN Security
Council’s inability to control the spread of international terrorism, debate
as to the status of previously accepted military responses under
customary international law remains strong, and many states have urged
for an expansion of the legitimate use of force under the Charter.
A. Article 2(4): Proscription of Force
Article 2(3) of the Charter provides that “[a]ll members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”21
Article 2(4) elaborates on the need for peaceful resolution of disputes:
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.”22
Article 2(4) is the provision on which present day jus ad bellum
hinges.23 The use of force in international relations proscribed in the

19. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
20. Article 51 of the UN Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security. (emphasis added).
21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
22. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter provides: “All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.” (emphasis added).
23. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(hereinafter Nicaragua Case) (noting that article 2(4) articulates the “principle of the
prohibition of force” in international relations and avoids the term “war”).
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article includes both war and other forcible measures short of war.24 Its
significance has been emphasized by international law scholars who
label it “the cornerstone of this new regime” 25 that “promote[s] peace by
prohibiting the use of force and protecting the sovereignty of the member
states”26 and “the heart of the United Nations Charter.”27 Undoubtedly,
the wording of Article 2(4) constitutes a considerable improvement when
compared with Article I of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In Article 2(4) the
use of force in general is prohibited, rather than only war as in the
Kellog-Briand Pact. Furthermore, under the Charter, the prohibition is
not confined to the actual use of force but extends to the mere threat of
force.28 Finally, the prohibition is, at least in theory, safeguarded by a
system of collective sanctions against any offender.29
The terms “territorial integrity” and “political independence” include
most forms of armed force, and are not intended to restrict the scope of
Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the use of force.30 Rather, the two given
modes of the use of force cover any possible kind of trans-frontier use of
armed force. Thus, an incursion into the territory of another state
constitutes an infringement of Article 2(4), even if it is not intended to
deprive that state of part of its territory or if the invading troops are
meant to withdraw immediately after completing a temporary and limited
operation. In other words, “integrity” has to be read as “inviolability,”
proscribing any kind of forcible trespassing.31 Gaps that may possibly be
left by these terms are filled by the remaining clause in Article 2(4),
which outlaws the threat or use of force “in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”32

24. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
25. Bartram S. Brown, Special Project: Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads,
41 WM & MARY L. REV. 1683, 1687–88 (2000).
26. Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B.U.
INT’L L. J. 195, 197 (1993).
27. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1620 (1984).
28. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4; Kellogg-Briand pact, supra note 1.
29. See U.N. Charter, arts. 39–51 (providing the Security Council with the right to
decide where there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and
permitting necessary action to address such acts; furthermore, the Charter provides the
rights of individual or collective self- defense).
30. Id.
31. Jackson Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law? The “Bush Doctrine” of Preemptive Strikes and the UN Charter on the Use of Force, 7 U.W. SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 33–
34 (2003).
32. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
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Notably, under Article 2(4) the prohibition of interstate force is not
applicable to UN members only. The provision forbids use of force by
UN members against any state. Recourse to force by non-member states
is dealt with in Article 2(6).33 Article 2(6) is a radical provision that
seeks to bind even non-signatories to the UN Charter in contravention of
Article 35 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
states that an obligation inures on a third state only if it accepts
obligation in writing.34 However, as Article 38 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties sets forth, treaty norms may become binding on
third states as rules of customary international law.35 When conventional
international law crystallizes as customary law, the norm which has its
genesis in a treaty becomes binding on a third state.
The principle of prohibition of the threat or the use of force, well
enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, has been further elaborated
by several consensual law-making decisions of the UN General
Assembly including, in particular, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly
Relations36 and the 1974 Declaration on the Definition of Aggression.37
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, besides restating Article
2(4) of the UN Charter,38 emphasizes that such threat or use of force
“shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.”39
B. Article 51: The State’s Right to Respond in Self-Defence
Having proscribed forcible self-help, the UN Charter nevertheless
permits state actions that are reasonably necessary as self-defence in the
face of an “armed attack.”40 The starting point for any discussion on the

33. Id. at art. 2, para. 6.
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 84, para. 1, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
35. Id. art. 38.
36. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct.
24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
37. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142–43, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
38. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
39. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 36, at 123.
40. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 432–
33 (1963). Professor Brownlie has categorised several Article 51 exceptions to the
restrictions on the use of force. They are as follows:
1. acts of self-defence;
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subject of self-defence is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that
“nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”41
Although the wording of the article appears clear—the right of selfdefence is generated when an attack occurs, i.e., the attack must be
occurring before the use of force is legitimate—practice has shown that
the picture can be more complicated.
In particular, the use of the term “inherent” has polarized
commentators and states.42 Though the Charter does not indicate what
rights are “inherent,” the inclusion of this term was considered
significant enough by the drafters of the Charter to warrant its inclusion
when revising Article 51.43 The initial draft of Article 51 made no
mention of this “inherent right,” but it was changed to make the
definition of self-defence acknowledge that right.44 Despite the ongoing
debate, a major question remains whether the right of self-defence under
Article 51 is limited to cases of armed attack or whether there are other
instances in which self-defence may be available under Article 51. Two
schools of thought have developed with regard to the scope of Article 51:
those who take the literal, or restrictive, approach and those who take the
view that Article 51 is considerably broader than its terms.

2. acts of collective self-defence;
3. actions authorised by a competent international organ (e.g., the United
Nations Security Council);
4. where treaties confer rights to intervene or where an ad hoc invitation or
consent is given by the territorial sovereign;
5. actions to terminate trespass;
6. necessity arising from natural catastrophe; and
7. measures to protect the lives or property of a state’s nationals in a foreign
territory.
41. U.N. Charter art. 51.
42. See, e.g., MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 232–
41(1961).
43. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31,at 25.
44. RUTH B. RUSSELL ASSISTED BY JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UN
CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1945698 –99 (1958).
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1. The Restrictionist Approach
The Restrictionist approach cites the absolute prohibition of forcible
self-help, as set out in Article 2(4), subject only to the limited exception
contained in Article 51.45 Under this reading, the exception permits
recourse to self-defence only when faced with actual “armed attack,” and
Article 51 does not contemplate anticipatory or pre-emptive actions by a
state so threatened.46 Rather, it requires a state to refrain from responding
with like force unless actively involved in repelling an armed attack.47 A
significant number of writers argue that an armed attack is the exclusive
circumstance in which the use of armed force is sanctioned under Article
51.48 In fact, one commentator has gone so far as to state that “the
leading opinion among scholars” is that the right of self-defence in
Article 51 does not extend beyond armed attack.49 Furthermore, the
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case clearly stated that
the right of self-defence under Article 51 only accrues in the event of an
armed attack.50 Also, it is a traditional requirement of self-defence that a
triggering event justifying a military response has already occurred or at
least be imminent.51
Restrictionists argue that by the time of the drafting of the UN Charter,
“self-defense was understood to be justified only in case of an attack by
the forces of a state.”52 Professor Brownlie notes that if Article 51 of the
UN Charter is the authoritative definition of the right of self-defence and
it is not qualified or supplemented by the customary law, then states are
bound by the black-letter law of the Charter and have less extensive
grounds to support armed force undertaken outside the framework of the
UN Charter.53
45. JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 94–95 (Univ. Cal. Press.) (1958).
46. U.N. Charter art. 51.
47. STONE, supra note 45.
48. See, e.g.,YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 168 (3d ed.,
2001). Dinstein concludes that the choice of words in Article 51 was deliberately
restrictive and that the right to self-defence was limited to an armed attack.
49. Id. at 168. See also Michael Franklin Lohr, Legal Analysis of U.S. Military
Responses to State-Sponsored International Terrorism
, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 18 (1985).
50. In paragraph 195 of its Opinion, the Court said that the exercise of the right of
self-defence by a state under Article 51 “is subject to the state concerned having been the
victim of an armed attack”. Nicaragua Case, supra note 23, at 103.
51. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 91–92 (1992).
52. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 280.
53. Id. at 279.
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Though the Charter “may be regarded as objective or general
international law,”54 most recognized independent states have expressly
accepted the principles and obligations of the Charter.55 Furthermore, the
“provisions of the Charter have had strong influence on state practice
since 1945, and the terms of Article 51 or very similar terms, have
appeared in several important multilateral treaties and draft
instruments.”56
2. The Counter-Restrictionist Approach
The Counter-Restrictionist approach adopts an expansionist view.
Proponents interpret the Charter to recognize and include those rights of
self-defence that existed under customary international law prior to its
drafting.57 Oliver Schacter concisely states this position thus:
On one reading [of Article 51] this means that self-defense is limited to
cases of armed attack. An alternative reading holds that since the article
is silent as to the right of self-defense under customary law (which goes
beyond cases of armed attack), it should not be construed by
implication to eliminate that right . . . . It is therefore not implausible to
interpret Article 51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-defense as it
58
existed prior to the Charter.

54. Id. at 280.
55. Id. at 280.
56. Id. Thus, article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947
provided for individual or collective self-defence in case of an “armed attack”. InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature Sept. 2, 1947, 62 U.S.T.
1681, 324 U.N.T.S. 21 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1948). Though articles 18 and 25 of the
Bogotá Charter are primarily concerned with reaction to the use of force, the latter article
refers ambiguously to “an act of aggression that is not an armed attack” and is concerned
only with the application of “measures and procedures”, whilst the former merely refers
to “the case of self-defence in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfilment thereof.”
Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 18, 25, opened for signature Apr.
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 1609 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec.13, 1951). The Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the International Law
Commission in 1949, provides in Article 12 that “[e]very State has the right of individual
or collective self-defence against armed attack.” International Law Commission, Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States art. 12, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/declar.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
57. See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Legality of State Response to Acts of Terrorism, in
TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 133, 137–38 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
58. Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633–34.
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Customary law traditionally recognized a limited right of pre-emptive
self-defence according to the “Caroline criteria”:59 the necessity of selfdefence “must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment of deliberation” and the action taken must not be
“unreasonable or excessive.”60 Martti Koskenniemi notes that the right of
self-defence articulated in the UN Charter “should be read rationally
against some useful purpose that the rule serves….”61 Koskenniemi
argues that the purpose of Article 51 was “to protect the sovereignty and
the independence of the state,”62 and that if a state feels its sovereignty
and independence threatened by the actions of another country, it might
be entitled to use force against that country, even if the country’s hostile
actions had not yet risen to the level of an actual armed attack.63 CounterRestrictionist advocates hold the view that Article 2(4) left the right of
self-defence unimpaired and that the right implicitly accepted was not
confined to reaction to “armed attack” within Article 51 but permitted
the protection of certain substantive rights:
Action undertaken for the purpose of, and limited to, the defense of a
state’s political independence, territorial integrity, the lives and
property of its nationals (and even to protect its economic
independence) cannot by definition involve a threat or use of force
“against the territorial integrity or political independence” of any other
64
state.

In line with Counter-Restrictionist proponents, it can be said that apart
from the restrictive phrases in Article 2(4), Article 51 and Article 2(4)
were not intended to, and do not restrict the right of member states to use
force in self-defence as defined by customary international law.
According to this position, Article 51 refers merely to “armed attack”
because it was inserted for the particular purpose of clarifying the
position of defence treaties which are concerned only with external

59. Michael Byers, Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bushbyers.html.
60. Id.
61. Martti Koskenniemi, Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bushkoskenniemi.html.
62. Id.
63. See Id.
64. D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185–86 (1958).
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attack.65 Therefore, despite apparent specificity, the Charter leaves the
broader customary right, which is always implicitly reserved, intact.
3. Anticipatory Self-Defence
Contrary to the permissive and expansive reading of the Charter by
some scholars, international opinion on the impermissibility of
anticipatory self-defence was never clearer than Israel’s 1981 attack on
Iraq.66 Fearing that it might eventually be a target of Iraq’s efforts to
develop nuclear weaponry, Israel reduced Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor to
rubble.67 Israel argued vehemently that the attack was justified based on
the right of anticipatory self-defence.68 The world was outraged and rose
up in one voice to condemn the act.
The world was outraged by Israel’s raid on June 7 1981. “Armed attack
in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach
of international law,” Margaret Thatcher thundered. Jeane Kirkpatrick,
the U.S. ambassador to the UN and as stern a lecturer as Britain’s then
prime minister, described it as “shocking” and compared it to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. American newspapers were as fulsome.
“Israel’s sneak attack . . . was an act of inexcusable and shortsighted
aggression,” said the New York Times. The Los Angeles Times called it
“state-sponsored terrorism”.
The greatest anger erupted at the UN. Israel claimed Saddam Hussein
was trying to develop nuclear weapons and it was acting in selfdefense, which is legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Other
countries did not agree. They saw no evidence that Iraq’s nuclear
energy programme, then in its infancy and certified by the International
Atomic Energy Agency as peaceful, could be described as military,
aggressive or directed against a particular country. In any case, pre-

65. See Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 26.
66. The United Nations Security Council condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in a unanimous resolution adopted on June 19, 1981. S.C. Res. 487, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
67. Judith Miller, Was Iraq Planning to Make the Bomb? Debates by Experts Seems;
Inconclusive, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1981, at A11.
68. Jehuda Blum, Israeli Delegate to the United Nations, Speech Before the Security
Council (June 19, 1981), in Excerpts from Speech by Israeli Delegate to UN, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1981, at 15.
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emptive action by one country against another country which offers no
69
imminent threat is illegal.

The Security Council condemned Israel’s bombing of the Osirak
reactor and unanimously passed Resolution 487, strongly denouncing the
Israeli action as illegal.70 In addition to condemning the attack, the
United States, under the authority of the Arms Control Act of 1968,
suspended arms shipments to Israel on the grounds that those arms were
to be used for defensive purposes only.71 Invoking the standards of
customary international law in general, and the Caroline factors in
particular, the international community’s opposition to the bombing as
self-defence was based on the fact that the Iraqi threats, as well as their
construction of the reactor, did not amount to an “armed attack” on
Israel.72
Politicians, policymakers, and the world at large were unanimous in
sensing that Israel’s pre-emptive strike was taking the world down a
slippery slope.73 If pre-emption was accepted as legal, the fragile
stru
c ture of international peace would be undermined. Any state could
attack another under the pretext that it detected a threat, however distant.
Notwithstanding the clear position taken by the Security Council and the
international community, the parameters of a state’s “inherent” right to
defend against armed attack is far from settled.
C. Reprisals and the UN Charter
In the heyday of anticipatory self-defence, states dealt with each other
on the basis of reciprocity.74 There were no supranational institutions to
69. Jonathan Steele, The Bush Doctrine Makes Nonsense of the UN Charter,
GUARDIAN (London),
June
7,
2002,
at
para.
2–3,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/bush/story/0,7369,728870,00.html.
70. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981). This was especially
compelling given that the U.S. was a party to the resolution. See id.
71. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. 2572 (2000).
72. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at parats. 115, 299, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288
(June 19, 1981). It is notable that in this, as well as later Security Council condemnations
of Israeli action, the premeditation evident in the military operation was considered an
argument against accepting the offered justification of self-defence. For example the
Security Council also condemned the 1985 attack by Israeli F-16s on the PLO
Headquarters located in Tunisia, by a vote of 14–0, with the United States abstaining.
S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985).
73. Paul Lewis, The UN’s Nuclear Cops Cover a Tough Bear, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1981, at D3.
74. Reciprocity was fundamental to the international law regime on the use of war in
its formative stages in the sense that rules were recognized to be binding legal obligations
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make or enforce international law. States had the right to retaliate against
states that failed to honor bilateral or multilateral arrangements through
use of reprisals (retaliation by force) in ways that would otherwise have
been considered illegal. “In the absence of a supranational authority, this
form of self-help was a way for states to get compensation for their
losses, punish their offenders, and deter future violations.”75
The purpose of international bodies such as the League of Nations and
the United Nations was to limit this use of force, and to provide a forum
for the resolution of conflict in international matters so as to prevent the
need for war. The text of the UN Charter reflects this intent and
represents a conventional rejection of the just war theories of retribution;
to permit reprisals would thwart the very goal to which states have
committed themselves by membership in the United Nations.76
Many commentators believe retaliation and reprisals to be illegal under
the UN Charter, citing the specific language of Articles 2 and 51.77
Taken together, Articles 2 and 51 comprise a minimum order in the sense
that they protect only the primary interest in freedom from aggression
and the right of self-defence.78 “The provisions of the Charter relating to
the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-resort to the use of force are
owing to the centrality of war as a legal sanction. In all instances that armed conflict
arose, states routinely claimed legitimacy of armed measures on the enforcement of some
international obligation or entitlement. The ever-present possibility of war and the
measures taken by states to prepare for and carry out military security meant that that the
apprehension of discord and hostility between the States championed self-interest. The
relationship between the balance of power and the law of nations was intimately tied in
with the balance of power system as a part of the law of nations. States could punish a
state threatening the balance, and armed attack in whatever context triggered all the rights
of self-preservation. International law was in essence primarily enforced through
reciprocal entitlement violations (underpinned by military force)—if state A violated an
entitlement of state B, state B was justified in violating an entitlement of state A.
However, development of military technology exposed the danger of potential escalations
of entitlement violations leading to international anarchy, hence the need to replace
politics with legal principles as the yardstick for governing war or resort to war. See
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (2d ed. 1995).
75. Stéphanie Giry, New World, Old Law: Would a Unilateral Strike Against Iraq
Ever Have Been Legal? LEGAL AFFAIRS Jan./ Feb. 2003, at 21.
76. See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: SelfDefence and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243, 286 (1987). In the
case of Israel, however, the United States has sometimes insisted, before condemning a
reprisal by Israel, that the terrorist act that prompted the reprisal also be condemned.
William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defence in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 433 (1990).
77. Roberts, supra note 76, at 282.
78. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 42, at 121–24.
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universally regarded as prohibiting reprisals which involve the use of
force.”79 These authorities conclude that the UN Charter requires states
to settle disputes peacefully under Article 2(3) and prohibits all forms of
forcible self-help other than the exercise of self-defence within the
meaning of Article 51.
The Security Council expressed its view of the status of reprisals in
1964 when it censured Great Britain for carrying out a reprisal against
the Yemeni town of Harib in retaliation for alleged Yemeni support of
the anti-colonial struggle in Aden.80 After several Yemeni attacks on the
South Arabian Federation, the British commenced air attacks on Yemen
in 1964.81 The United Kingdom Representative, after discussing the
series of Yemeni attacks, stated:
It will also be abundantly plain that, contrary to what a number of
speakers have said or implied, this action was not retaliation or a
reprisal . . . . There is, in existing law, a clear distinction to be drawn
between two forms of self-help. One, which is of a retributive or
punitive nature, is termed “retaliation” or “reprisals;” the other, which
is expressly contemplated and authorized by the Charter, is self-defense
against armed attack . . . it is clear that the use of armed force to repel
or prevent an attack—i.e. legitimate action of a defensive nature—may
sometimes have to take the form of a counter-attack.82

Despite the United Kingdom representative’s delicate attempt to cloak
the reprisals in the acceptable language of self-defence, the Security
Council refused to be hoodwinked, denounced the actions as reprisals,
and “deplore[d]” the British action.83 By a vote of nine to zero, with two
abstentions, the Security Council determined that it “[c]ondemns
reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.”84 The Council’s rationale was that the members of the United
Nations contracted not to use force to achieve solutions to international
controversies.85 A reprisal, not considered as the use of force in self-

79. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 281.
80. Lohr, supra note 49, at 32.
81. Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L.
1, 8 (1972).
82. U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1109th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc S/PV.1109 (Apr. 7, 1964).
83. S.C. Res. 188, para. 7, U.N. Doc S/RES/188 (Apr. 9, 1964).
84. Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM.
J. INT’L L. 415, 429 (1969).
85. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to
International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.
J. 1063, 1063– 64 (1958).
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defence, was, therefore, considered an illegal use of force.86 Clearly the
Security Council took the dominant restrictionist view in international
law in rejecting the legitimacy of any reprisal or anticipatory selfdefence.
“This de jure prohibition on reprisal found its way into documentary
form in 1970”87 when the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the UN Charter was adopted.88 The Declaration on
Friendly Relations tenor was emphatic that members of the United
Nations have legally renounced the use of peacetime reprisals.89 The first
principle provides that “[s]tates shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.”90 One of the duties imposed
under this principle is to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of
force.91
On its face, the Declaration on Friendly Relations seems to flatly reject
the use of reprisals under all circumstances. This assertion is borne out
by subsequent condemnations of reprisals by the international
community. In 1972, in reaction to constant terrorist attacks by Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) elements based in neighboring Lebanon,
it reminded and in the same breath warned Lebanon that it had an
international legal obligation to prevent its territory from being used as a
base for armed attacks against Israel by the PLO.92 A few weeks later on
February 25, 1972, Israel sent forces, tanks, armored cars, heavy
artillery, and air support into Lebanon to attack PLO bases.93 In response,
the Security Council issued Resolution 313. When debating Resolution
313, France denounced “these intolerable reprisals.”94 The final
Resolution did not mince words demanding “that Israel immediately
86. Falk, supra note 84, at 429.
87. See Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945—Resurrection of the Reprisal and
Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
1, 13 (2003).
88. Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban
on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and
Criminalization, 20 M ICH. J. INT’L L. 477, 489 (1999).
89. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 36, at 121–24.
90. Id. at 122.
91. Id. at 123.
92. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 426–27.
93. Id. at 427.
94. Id. at 436, n.87.
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desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against
Lebanon and forthwith withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese
territory.”95 Israel adopted a blasé attitude towards this Resolution and
was soon back in Lebanon attacking PLO bases. The Security Council
was once again seized of the matter. Belgium stated that “[t]he Belgian
Government has never ceased to repudiate energetically the military
reprisal actions undertaken by Israel against Lebanon.”96 The final
Resolution of June 26, 1972, denounced Israel ’s actions as violating the
UN Charter.97
About a decade later, on December 27, 1985, simultaneous bombings
of airline offices in Rome and Vienna left twenty innocent people dead,
including five Americans, with over eighty people injured.98 Four months
later on April 5, 1986, a bomb explosion in a West German discotheque
frequented by American servicemen killed two American servicemen
and wounded 154 persons—50 to 60 were Americans.99 In both
instances, intelligence traced the perpetrators back to Libya. In the early
hours of April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force and Naval aircraft
simultaneously bombed targets in Libya. Despite the positive reaction
from the U.S. Congress,100 both the Security Council and General
Assembly condemned the U.S. attacks. While the Resolution to condemn
the attack by the Security Council failed owing to vetoes by the United
States, United Kingdom, and France, the vote in the General Assembly
was successful.
However, the clear stance of the international community on the
legality of reprisals wavered in the late 1980s. Beginning in July 1987,
during the course of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States conducted
escort operations of tankers in the Gulf. After months of volatility and
gunboat diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, on April 14, 1988 Iranian
submarine mines damaged a U.S. naval ship. Four days later, the United
States retaliated with attacks that decimated two Iranian oil platforms.101

95. S.C. Res. 313, para. 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/313 (Feb. 28, 1972).
96. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 436 n.87.
97. Id. at 427–28.
98. Lary Rohter, Airlines Say They had Warnings About Possible Move by Terrorists,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1985, at A1.
99. John Tagliabue, 2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1986, at A1.
100. Gerald M. Boyd, Genesis of a Decision; How the President Approved Retaliatory
Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at A11.
101. David Hoffman & Lou Cannon, U.S. Retaliates, Hits Iran Oil Platforms in Gulf,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1988, at A1.
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The next day, President Reagan stated that the United States’ action was
“to make certain the Iranians have no illusions about the cost of
irresponsible behavior.”102 The Reagan administration claimed the strike
was in “retaliation”103 for mine laying by Iran and that “any further
mining by Iran would bring harsher military reprisals.”104 In this
instance:
[t]here was no Security Council debate on these hostilities. In some
cases, the U.S. forces clearly acted in self-defense. In other cases, as in
the retaliatory strikes of October 19, 1987 and April 18, 1988, U.S.
attacks were not immediate. These actions could easily be characterized
as preventive, deterrent measures and, just as readily, as punitive
measures.105

The seeming indifference by the United Nations in this instance
buttressed by other subsequent incidents, forms the basis of the view that
the Charter does not prohibit reprisals entirely. In the late 1980s, the
General Assembly and the Security Council appear to have adopted a
policy inconsistent with their spoken opposition to reprisals.106 The
Council has generally not condemned acts of reprisal which it considered
“reasonable,” while voting to condemn actions considered excessive or
disproportionate. 107 In so doing, the Council has appeared to indicate its
toler ance of some proportional acts of reprisal. As one scholar observes:
There is, however, a contrary view that the Charter does not prohibit
forcible self-help, i.e., reprisals entirely. An argument can be made that
resorts to reprisals are both legal and desirable under the Charter. First,
Security Council practice implies the recognition of the legitimacy of
some type of reasonable reprisal. There is an inconsistency between the
Security Council’s alleged principle of the illegality of all armed
reprisals and the Council’s practice in not condemning a particular
reprisal because it appeared reasonable. A practice of condemning only

102. John H. Cushman Jr., U.S. Strikes 2 Iranian Oil Rigs and Hits 6 Warships in
Battles Over Mining Sea Lanes in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1988, at A10.
103. Major Phillip A. Seymour, The Legitimacy of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool
against State-Sponsored Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 221, 224 (1990).
104. Hoffman & Cannon, supra note 101.
105. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 427.
106. Not all acts of reprisal result in Security Council condemnation. See Barry
Levenfield, Israel’s Counter Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal
under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 35 (1982).
107. Id.
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unreasonable or disproportionate reprisals is, in effect, an affirmation of
the right of states to resort to reasonable reprisals.108

Therefore, under recent UN practices, the status of reprisals may be
viewed as illegal de jure but accepted de facto, provided they meet the
requirement of proportionality. The troubling question of whether any
other forcible form of self-help outside of self-defence is permitted under
the Charter thus persists.109
Having canvassed the various avenues regarding the use of force, the
author resists the temptation to move straight to the matter of the use of
force and terrorism without addressing the controversial issue of
humanitarian intervention. Though this does not strike a direct chord
with the central theme of the Article, the most explicit form of unilateral
action in the post-UN Charter era without UN authority has been
premised in large part on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
Vestiges of this doctrine have an increasing resonance in the plethora of
justifications for the unilateral decision by the United States at the head
of the “Coalition of the Willing” to invade Iraq in 2003 without explicit
UN authority.110 It is therefore only appropriate that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention get mention.
D. Humanitarian Intervention and the UN Charter
It is significant that under the UN Charter, the third explicit exception
to the general prohibition on the use of force, found in Chapter VIII of
the Charter, permits actions undertaken by “regional arrangements or
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security.”111 Significantly, this is not a carte
blanche, since regional alliances may undertake any action in this regard
that is “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations.”112
108. Lohr, supra note 49, at 32–33.
109. U.N. Charter art. 51.
110. Christopher Hobson notes:
With America’s primary claims for invading Iraq—weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) and links to terrorism—being largely discredited, bringing
democracy to the country has increasingly become the central justification by
President Bush and his supporters for overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Christopher Hobson, A Forward Strategy of Freedom in the Middle East: U.S.
Democracy Promotion and the “War on Terror,” 59 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 39, 40 (2005).
111. U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1.
112. Id.
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In general, humanitarian intervention entails a unilateral or multilateral
intervention by a foreign power in a third country in reaction to serious
and systematic violations of human rights by the government. Prior to the
twentieth century, a general custom and practice of humanitarian
inter vention existed.113 The legal doctrine finds scholarly support as early
as the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius wrote that “where
[tyrants] . . . provoke their own people to despair and resistance by
unheard of cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature,
they lose the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim
the privilege of the law of nations.”114 This historical doctrine is
strengthened by an emerging notion of a duty to protect civilians that has
its genesis in the horrors of post-World War II.
For almost the entire history of the UN, it has recognized that certain
human rights violations are beyond the pale of state sovereignty and
constitute a threat to peace and security. Consequently, proponents of
humanitarian intervention argue that the UN has endorsed the notion
that sovereignty is secondary in importance to the basic human right to
115
life.

However, the matter of humanitarian intervention in the post-UN
Charter era was brought strongly to the fore with NATO’s reaction to the
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by Serbian forces.116 On March 24, 1999,

113. See David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 258–59 (1992).
114. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 288 (A.C. Campbell trans.,
photo reprint 1979) (1901). John J. Merriam notes:
Proponents of intervention . . . cite the British, French, and Russian
intervention in Greece (1827-1830), the Russian intervention in Turkey (18771878), and the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb intervention in Macedonia (1903) as
examples of humanitarian interventions that were regarded as legal operations.
John J. Merriam, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 111, 119 (2001).
115. Id. at 122.
116. It should of course be noted that there have been previous acts premised on some
form of pseudo-humanitarian intervention, but this has been largely within the framework
of UN authorisation. One need only recall the acts in relation to the first Gulf War and the
no fly zone, Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor. Though these actions may sit
uncomfortably within the UN regime on the use of force, they nonetheless found some
sort of legitimacy via subsequent Security Council resolutions. For a concise overview of
these military operations, see Jackson Maogoto, People First, Nations Second: A New
Role for the UN as an Assertive Human Rights Custodian, AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 120, 133–38
(2000).

2006]

WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW TIGHTROPE

23

without the benefit of a UN Security Council resolution expressly
authorizing military action, NATO began a seventy-eight day air
campaign over the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).117 The
Kosovo operation was preceded by months of diplomatic efforts to
resolve the region’s problems peacefully. The United Nations, OSCE,
NATO, and the United States all participated in a multitude of diplomatic
moves aimed at curbing the violence and reaching a political solution.
“The legal debate over humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has been
posed as a tension between two competing principles: respect for the
‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ of states and the
guarantees for human rights
. . . .”118
Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue that the use of force
against a sovereign state violates the most imperative international legal
norms, not to mention the UN Charter.119
The major argument against a legal doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is that it would open the door to “pretextual” intervention .
. . this legal doctrine is founded in the custom and practice of states,
and because it is so controversial, there has never been a universally
accepted standard established for regulating and evaluating
humanitarian interventions. Whatever standard exists is only that which
can be drawn from the past practice of intervening states, and as such is
120
vague and malleable.

Proponents of the doctrine argue that despite the general prohibition on
the use of force encapsulated in the UN Charter, a legal doctrine of
humanitarian intervention survives, embodied in the custom and practice
of state actors in the international arena.121 This argument is based in
large part on the fact that the United Nations was formed to prevent the
use of force as a means of settling disputes and to protect universal

117. The operation’s objective was “to degrade and damage the military and security
structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President) has used to depopulate and
destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.” William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defence,
Prepared Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr. 15, 1999) available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/.
118. Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons
from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1752 (2000).
119. See Merriam, supra note 114, at 119–21.
120. Id. at 126.
121. See generally David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992) (providing a comprehensive examination of
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention).
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human rights.122 “Some states have opted to use force as a means of last
resort to prevent humanitarian tragedy, while at the same time seeking to
establish a self-defense argument in order to avoid UN sanction.”123
Traction for this argument can also be found in the observation that the
UN Charter not only permits intervention on humanitarian grounds, it
requires it in cases of gross and systemic human rights abuses.124 Articles
55 and 56 of the UN Charter implore “[a]ll Members [to] pledge
themselves to take joint action in cooperation with the Organization for
the achievement of . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . .”125
A key point that undermined NATO’s claims that the Kosovo action
was a permissible use of force was the foggy and often incoherent
grounds it provided as justification. Despite its seemingly humanitarian
dimensions, the Kosovo action was not a textbook example of the
doctrine, and was dressed up with other justifications at odds with the
central ground of humanitarian intervention. Professor Julie Mertus
notes:
NATO did not act only in the name of human rights. Instead, leaders of
NATO countries offered a cafeteria of justifications for their actions.
The Clinton Administration considered but refused to base its actions in
Kosovo solely on humanitarian rights grounds. Instead, the
Administration offered an array of justifications. Humanitarian
concerns were rolled together with other factors: the need for regional
stabilization, the stemming of refugee flows, and the need to protect
126
NATO’s reputation.

Mertus goes on to note that “by failing to specify clearly the legal
parameters of their actions, the NATO allies exposed themselves to
criticism suggesting that NATO was not operating under any legal
grounds at all.” 127 Mertus follows this concern by noting that by failing

122. See Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117, 124 (1993).
123. Merriam, supra note 114, at 114.
124. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie
and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
229, 231–2 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (discussing several instances in which
interventions occurred for humanitarian purposes).
125. U.N. Charter arts. 55, para. (c), 56.
126. Julie Mertus, The Imprint of Kosovoon the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 6
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 528 (2000).
127. See Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note
118, at 1748–49.
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to provide clear legal justifications for intervention on human rights
grounds, human rights advocates opened themselves up to similar
criticism that they were outside the law.
As this part of the Article has shown, the vagueness and confusion of
conceptual elements and malleable past precedent clouds the UN Charter
regime on the use of force. Having canvassed the various avenues
regarding the use of force, the Article now turns to consider the use of
military force as a counter-measure against terrorism in view of the fact
that it is generally held to be inconsistent with the UN Charter regime on
the use of force.
III. THE COLD WAR ERA: TERRORIST ACTION AND REACTION
During the Cold War Era, increased terrorist attacks focused attention
on the capabilities of elite forces trained for anti-terrorist operations. The
1976 Israeli hostage rescue at Entebbe in the aftermath of the hijacking
of Air France Flight 139 marked the opening salvo in the use of military
force to counter terrorism.129 About three years later, on November 4,
1979, a mob of Iranians seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking a
large group of employees hostage and sparking the Iranian hostage crisis.
Five months later, the impotence of diplomatic efforts led the Carter
administration to order a rescue effort by helicopter, but the mission was
aborted.130 In 1981, following the release of the Iranian Embassy
hostages, Reagan warned that when the rules of international behavior
are violated, the U.S. policy would be one of “swift and effective
retribution.”131 The Reagan administration was sending initial indications
that a hard line, conceivably involving the use of military force, would be
taken with terrorists in the future.
Two years later on April 18, 1983, sixty-three people were killed and
one hundred twenty were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb
attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.132 Six months later, on

128. See Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note
114, at 1748–49.
129. See generally YESHAYAHU BEN-PORAT, EITAN HABER & ZEEV SCHIFF, ENTEBBE
RESCUE (Louis Williams trans., Delacorte Press 1977) (1976) (providing an overview of
the Israeli hostage rescue in Entebbe).
130. See GARY SICK, OCTOBER SURPRISE: AMERICA’S HOSTAGES IN IRAN AND THE
ELECTION OF RONALD REAGAN 19–20 (1991).
131. Richard Halloran, Swift U.S. Retribution for Terrorists Called Doubtful, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1981, at B13.
132. U.S. Army, Timeline of Terrorism, http://www.army.mil/terrorism/19891980/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
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October 23, 1983, in another terrorist attack, a large Mercedes truck
exploded with such terrific force that the headquarters of the First
Battalion, Eighth Marine Regiment was instantly reduced to rubble with
the loss of two hundred forty-two Amer icans.133 The Islamic Jihad
claimed responsibility for both attacks.134 The bombings precipitated
renewed debate over whether U.S. military forces were adequately
prepared to deal with terrorism and whether the United States would use
force either in anticipation of, or in response to, terrorism.
The Long Commission, in commenting upon the devastating attack on
the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut, concluded:
[S]tate sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of
warfare and . . . adequate response to this increasing threat requires an
active national policy which seeks to deter attack or reduce its
effectiveness. The Commission further concludes that this policy needs
to be supported by political and diplomatic actions and by a wide range
of timely military response capabilities.135

The Long Commission report proved to be a turning point for U.S.
counter-terrorism policy. Despite definitional concerns, and fundamental
issues concerning the kind of responses the United States could lawfully
take within the rubric of international law, the United States had grown
tired of attacks against its interests and citizens and soon formally
embraced military force against terrorist violence. In opting to use force,
the United States took the position that it was necessary to accept some
risks to ensure that every terrorist success attracted the military might of
the United States.136 From the position of the United States, deterrence
was premised on terrorists fearing a forceful response from the victim
state.
A. New Frontiers on the Use of Force? Development of the Reagan and
Shultz Doctrines
On April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed the National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD), which assigned responsibility for
developing strategies to counter terrorism and made clear that, while use
of all the non-military options would be made, the United States was also
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. U.S. Dep’t Defense., Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International
Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 129 (1983), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982- 1984/DOD-Report.
136. Brian M. Jenkins, The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma, ARMED
FORCES J., 39, 44 (1985).
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prepared to respond within the parameters set by the law of armed
conflict. Defense Department official Noel Koch explained that the
NSDD “represent[ed] a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the
reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps [were] needed.”137
Significantly, the document incorporated some key elements: the United
States has a responsibility to take protective measures whenever
evidence arises that terrorism is about to be committed against U.S.
interests; and the threat of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression and
justifies acts in lawful self-defence.138 With this directive, the ground was
formally laid for the “Reagan Doctrine” of swift, effective retribution.
The NSDD signaled that, as far as the executive branch was concerned,
the debate over whether military force was inside or outside the range of
counter-terrorism measures was over. Henceforth, the United States
would use military force in both pre-emptive and retaliatory scenarios.
Although then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz had initially
advocated only “an active defense” against terrorists,139 growing
frustration over the inability of the United States to effectively counter
the accelerating frequency and violence of terrorist attacks prompted him
to re-evaluate his views on the nature of appropriate responses to
international terrorism, further expanding the controversial new U.S.
policy.
In late 1984 at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City, Shultz
asserted that the United States must be ready to use military force to fight
terrorism and retaliate even before all the facts are known.140 This was
the beginning of what later became known as the “Shultz Doctrine,” a
corollary of the “Reagan Doctrine.” Shultz predicted that the increased
terrorist attacks against strategic U.S. interests around the world in the
years ahead would necessitate a willingness to combat it using military
force.141 This signaled that an active policy of response by armed force to
terrorist attacks would be followed by the United States. In the same
speech, Shultz claimed a broad right on behalf of the United States to use
force against terrorist threats abroad, including a policy of pre-emptive

137. Robert C. Toth, Preemptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed, WASH. POST, Apr. 16,
1984, at A19.
138. Robert C. McFarlane, Terrorism and the Future of Free Society, Speech Delivered
at the Defence Strategy Forum (Mar. 25, 1985), in 8 TERRORISM 315, 321 (Yonah
Alexander ed., 1986).
139. Shultz urges “Active” Drive on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1984, at A3.
140. George Shultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, Terrorism and the Modern World, Address
Before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City (Oct. 25, 1984), printed in DEP’T
ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 12–17 [hereinafter Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World].
141. Id. at 16.
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strikes in foreign countries.142 Although arguably effective and
temporarily satisfying, the important concern was whether a policy of
armed response was wise in view of its probable violation of
international law. The U.S. ran the risk of incurring the massive
condemnation that would accompany a policy of systematic use of armed
force against terrorist attacks and the possibility of being branded an
international outlaw.143
Even as the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines” were forming, Israeli
action was actively providing a practical manifestation of the tenet
underlying these doctrines with regular military actions to counter
terrorism outside its territory—in Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia—
throughout the 1980s. The U.S. position that “[a]s a matter of U.S.
policy, retaliation against terrorist attacks is a legitimate response and an
expression of self-defense”144 was practically expressed in 1985 by
Israel. On October 1, 1985, six F-15 Israel fighter-bombers unleashed a
barrage of bombs on the headquarters of the PLO in a suburb of Tunis,
the capital of Tunisia, responding to alleged terrorist attacks.145 Israel
Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin seemed to echo Reagan and Shultz
when he stated: “[w]e decided the time was right to deliver a blow to the
headquarters of those who make the decisions, plan and carry out
terrorist activities.”146 The UN Security Council was swift to vigorously
142. Id.
143. ERNEST EVANS, CALLING A TRUCE TO TERROR 122 (1979).
144. U.S. Supports Attack, Jordan and Egypt Vow to Press for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1985, at A1. U.S. Ambassador Walters nevertheless supported the Israeli justification
for the attack in spite of the abstention:
My Government could not support the draft resolution disproportionately
placing all blame for this latest round of the rising spiral of violence in the
Middle East onto only one set of shoulders, while not also holding at fault those
responsible for the terrorist acts which provoked it . . . . We speak of a pattern
of violence, but we must be clear: it is terrorism that is the cause of this pattern,
not responses to terrorist attacks . . . . [W]e recognize and strongly support the
principle that a state subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with
appropriate use of force to defend itself against further attacks. This is an aspect
of the inherent right of self-defence recognized in the United Nations Charter.
We support this principle regardless of attacker, and regardless of victim.
U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg. at 46, U.N. Doc S/PV.2615 (Oct. 4, 1985).
145. The Israeli attack by six F-15 fighter-bombers apparently left 70 men, women and
children dead and more than 100 Tunisians and Palestinians wounded. See Donald R.
Morris, Cycle of Terrorism Will Continue with Retaliatory Strikes, HOUS. POST, Jan. 2,
1986, at 2B.
146. Israel Calls Bombing a Warning to Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1985, at A8.
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condemn the act as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, international
law, and norms of conduct.147 Three days after the attack, a single session
of the Security Council produced Resolution 573 (with only one
abstention by the United States), which condemned the Israeli attack;
demanded that Israel “refrain from perpetrating such acts of aggression
or from threatening to do so;” urged member states to “dissuade Israel
from resorting to such acts;” and supported Tunisia’s right to
reparations.148
The international community in general condemned the Israeli Tunis
raid as an act of aggression and a violation of Tunisia’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.149 Israel’s argument of self-defence against terrorism
was dismissed.150 Israel’s attack and the U.S.’s subsequent support in the
face of vitriolic condemnation by most countries was symptomatic of the
revolution in policy that the United States was undertaking. The United
States abstained from the string of condemnations that followed every
Israeli action debated in the Security Council, and began to veto
consideration of those resolutions, effectively ending discussion of the
matter within the Security Council.151 This change in U.S. reaction was
not just the result of a new, hawkish conservative administration; it was
also a response to the targeting of U.S. citizens and interests by statesponsored terrorists. U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walter’s explanation of
the U.S. abstention in the Security Council Resolution condemning
Israel’s bombing in Tunis is instructive:

147. A Resolution condemning the attacks was swiftly passed with a vote of fourteen
votes to none, with the United States abstaining. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573
(Oct. 4, 1985).
148. Id.
149. See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 80 A.J.I.L 151, 165–67 (1986) (discussing
resort to war and armed force).
150. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2615, supra note 144. See, e.g., remarks made by Ambassadors
Ononaiye, Golob, Kusumaatmadja, Chamorro Mora, Wasiuddin, Shihabi, Zarif, and Le
Kim Chung. Id.
151. The United States did not cast its first veto in favor of Israel until 1972. From
1967–72, the U.S. supported or abstained on 24 resolutions, most critical of Israel. From
1973–2003, the Security Council adopted approximately 100 resolutions on the Middle
East, again, most critical of Israel with the U.S. vetoing a total of 37 resolutions. Mitchell
Geoffrey Bard, Myths & Facts Online: The United Nations available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf13.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of voting patterns in the Security Council on
resolutions affecting and/or involving Israel, see MITCHELL GEOFFREY BARD, ET AL,
MYTHS AND FACTS: A CONCISE RECORD OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1992); HARRIS
SCHOENBERG, MANDATE FOR TERROR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PLO (1989).
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We . . . recognize and strongly support the principle that a state
subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate
use of force to defend against further attacks. This is an aspect of the
inherent right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations
Charter.152

Two months after the Israeli counter-terrorist attacks, the U.S.
frustration with the international regime on the use of force in countering
terrorism was captured clearly by Secretary of State Shultz’s outburst:
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing
terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the
soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from
using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or
guerrillas. International law requires no such result.153

With these words, Shultz laid down more building blocks for the
“Shultz Doctrine” and its highly controversial position advocating the
use of military force not only against terrorists, but also against states
that support, train, or harbor terrorists.154 This Doctrine was formally
fleshed out on January 15, 1986, in the Secretary’s speech on terrorism at
the National Defense University.155 In that speech, the Secretary added:
“a nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens, when no
other means is available.”156 This is so, the Secretary said, even though
others have “asserted that military action to retaliate or pre-empt
terrorism is contrary to international law.”157
Worldwide opposition to the new policy was swift in coming.
Surpris ingly, even some senior officials in the U.S. State Department
expressed reservations.158 U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger,
in charge of the machinery that would be tasked with affecting the
doctrine, opposed responsive military strikes that needlessly “kill women
152. Press Release No. 106, Vernon Walters, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations (Oct. 4, 1985), extract reprinted in 80 A.J.I.L. 166, 166–67.
153. George Shultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of
Ambiguity, Address Before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference (Jan. 15, 1986), in 25
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 204, 206 (1986). Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz Supports Armed
Reprisals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1986, at A1.
154. See Don Oberdorfer, Abraham Sofaer; State’s Legal Adviser Deals with Policy,
Then the Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1986, at A13.
155. Gwertzman, Shultz Supports Armed Reprisals, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz and Weinberger Disagree on Using Force
Against Libyans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1986, at A1.
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and children.”159 Additionally, Robert Oakley, Ambassador-at-Large for
Counter Terrorism, opined that the President’s Commission on Terrorism
had recommended that the United States not use military force to
retaliate against states supporting terrorists.160 International and domestic
opposition in the United States was a result of a number of difficult
issues raised by the doctrine, and the difficult questions raised by the
U.S.’s new policy:
[I]s the responding coercion still a use of force in self-defense against
an armed “attack?” Is the responding coercion primarily pre-emptive,
retaliatory, or for the purpose of imposing sanctions against a violation
of international law? And if among the latter, are any of these forms of
responsive coercion ever permissible?161

The United States was determined not to back down, and a few weeks
after Shultz had fleshed out his doctrine, the Vice President’s Task Force
on Combating Terrorism found: “[t]errorism has become another means
of conducting foreign affairs. Such terrorists are agents whose
association the state can easily deny. Use of terrorism by the country
entails few risks, and constitutes strong-arm, low-budget foreign
policy.”162 This statement echoed the Reagan administration’s concerns
over new and unconventional challenges to U.S. foreign policy in critical
areas of the world.
Though it was evident that this threat of low-intensity conflict raised a
host of new legal, political, military, and moral issues, it was not long
before the U.S. demonstrated that it was not overly concerned with the
questions that its new policy engendered and that the “Reagan” and
“Shultz Doctrines” were not just hollow rhetoric. On April 5, 1986, Le
Belle discotheque in West Germany, a spot popular with off-duty
American servicemen, was bombed, leaving two Americans dead and
over 154 persons injured.163 U.S. intelligence indicated Libya sponsored
this terrorist attack.164 President Reagan responded to this threat by
bombing military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya on April 14,
159. See Task Force Supports U.S. Policy on Global Terrorism, Official Says, HOUS.
POST, Mar. 2, 1986, at 13A.
160. See id.
161. Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of
Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 711, 716 (1986).
162. Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, Feb.
1986 at 2, available at http://www.population-security.org/bush_and_terror.pdf.
163. 2d U.S. Soldier Dies from Bombing of Disco, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1986, at C8.
164. U.S. Exercises Right of Self–Defence Against Libyan Terrorism, 86 DEP’T ST.
BULL. 1, 8 (June 1986).
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1986.165 The attack was met with condemnation.166 Critics claimed the
time lapse and proportionally of the attacks, as well as the choice of
targets undermined the primary justification of self-defence.167 As Major
Phillip A. Seymour notes:
Although President Reagan cited self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter as the legal basis for the air strike, his explanation
implicitly included retaliation (i.e., reprisal) as an additional
justification . . . . In deciding to use military force against Libya,
deterrence certainly was a major, if not the primary, consideration . . . .
This interpretation is supported by then-Vice President George Bush’s
comments a month prior to the Libyan raid when he stated that
American policy in combating terrorism would be one of a willingness
to “retaliate.”168

The Tripoli bombing was far from a one off event; it was part of a
crystallizing U.S. policy. This was despite the fact that international law
relating to self-defence did not accord with the American viewpoint. The
United States seemed determined to co-opt the use of military force
against terrorism within the infirm concept of anticipatory self-defence.
Two years later after the air raid on Tripoli, on December 21, 1988,
while cruising at an altitude of 31,000 feet, Pan American Flight 103
(“Flight 103”) exploded in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland.169 Two
hundred fifty-eight passengers and crew died in the explosion; another
seventeen townspeople died on the ground as a result of the fiery
debris.170 President Reagan ordered an inquiry into the circumstances of
the Flight 103 disaster and directed the preparation of a report intended
to be “a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy

165. Bernard Weintraub, U.S. Calls Libya Raid a Success; “Choice is Theirs,” Reagan
Says; Moscow Cancels Scultz Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at A1.
166. See William F. Buckley, Libya: Reactions, NAT’L REV., May 23, 1986, at 54;
George J. Church, U.S. Bombers Strike at Libya’s Author of Terrorism, Dividing
Eurpowe and Threateneing a Rash of Retaliations, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 16; Steve
Holland, West Talked Tough, but Terrorists Weren’t Listening; Attacks in 1986 Took a
Bloody Toll Despite Threats and Raid on Libya, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Cal.),
Dec.17, 1986, at 2A; William V. Shannon, Thatcher’s Reservations, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 10, 1987, at A21. See also Sir John Thompson, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2679th mtg.,
at 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2679 (1986) (Prime Minister Thatcher primarily concerned with
proportionality).
167. See Kelly, supra note 87, at 17.
168. Seymour, supra note 103, at 223.
169. Russell Watson, An Explosion in the Sky, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1989, at 16.
170. Id. at 17.
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options with respect to preventing terrorist acts involving aviation.”171
Among the recommendations of the President’s Commission were
“active measures—pre-emptive or retaliatory, direct or covert—against a
series of targets in countries well-known to have engaged in statesponsored terrorism.”172 These recommendations reinforced the vitality
of the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines” as part of the U.S. policy of preemption. It was, however, not until the end of the Cold War that the
United States had the opportunity to fully pursue this new national
policy.
IV. POST-COLD WAR: PROACTIVE ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM
In 1993, following the discovery of an Iraqi plot to assassinate then
U.S. President George Bush Sr. on a visit to Kuwait, the United States
fired twenty-three cruise missiles at Iraqi intelligence targets within
Iraq.173 Though the attack came after those involved in the plot in Kuwait
had been apprehended and then President Bush had completed his
planned visit, the justification presented to Congress by the President
was that the action was within the right of self-defence under Article
51.174
The next significant case of American action to counter terrorism
through military action came on August 7, 1998 when U.S. Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, killing at least 252 (including 12 U.S.
citizens) and injuring more than 5,000. Secretary of State Albright
pledged to “use all means at our disposal to track down and punish”
those responsible.175 On August 20, 1998, the United States responded by
launching seventy-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. warships.176
This attack was directed at an Osama bin Laden bankrolled Al Qaeda
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical
171. Exec. Order No. 32,629, 54 Fed. Reg. 12,686 (Aug. 4, 1989).
172. Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism 125
(May 25, 1990).
173. Jack M. Beard, Military Action against Terrorists Under International Law:
America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under International Law, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 (2002).
174. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters,
1 PUB. PAPERS 940 (June 28, 1993), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubapers/.
175. Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania:
A New Policy Direction? CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Sept. 1, 1998,
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/crs19980901.pdf (last visited
January 30, 2005).
176. W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to International Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 3, 47 (1999).
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plant177 that the Clinton Administration suspected was producing
chemical weapons components with bin Laden’s funding.178
The American justification for their military action was based on both
reprisal and anticipatory self-defence.179 In his address to the nation, then
U.S. President Bill Clinton told the American people that the strikes
against the “terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan” were
necessary because of the “imminent threat they presented to [U.S.]
national security.”180 Thus the Clinton Administration, like the Reagan
Administration before it, justified its response to terrorist strikes by
claiming self-defence. In a report sent to Congress, then President
Clinton claimed that the strikes were justified under the “inherent right of
self-defense consistent with Article 51 . . .” and at the same time were
intended to “prevent and deter additional attacks . . . .”181 Moreover,

177. Many critics later raised doubts about the quality of the evidence relied upon by
the Clinton Administration in its decision to strike the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant.
For a discussion of such doubts, see Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible
Responses to Terrorism, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 257–60(2000).
178. See Maureen F. Brennan, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S.
Response, and the Role of Customary International Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195 (1999). It
should be noted that Clinton’s reasons for striking Afghanistan and Sudan (in an effort to
reach bin Laden) are analogous to Reagan’s reasons for attacking Libya (in an effort to
reach Qadhafi). See O’Brien, supra note 76, at 463–65 (suggesting that the Reagan
administration attacked Libya in 1986 as a reprisal for Qadhafi’s suspected support of
terrorist attacks on U.S. targets). As Brennan explains:
[Though a]dmitting that the bin Laden terrorist “network” was not sponsored
by any state, Clinton outlined four reasons for the action: 1) overwhelming
evidence showed bin Laden “played the key role in the embassy bombings”; 2)
his network had been responsible for past terrorist attacks against Americans;
3) officials had “compelling information” that bin Laden was planning future
attacks and 4) his organization was attempting to obtain chemical weapons. In a
second statement, President Clinton carefully characterized the strikes as
necessary to defend against the threat of “imminent” and “immediate” future
attacks, and not as retribution or punishment.
See Brennan, supra at 1195– 96.
179. Remarks in Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, on Military Action Against
Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998), available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/.
180. Address to the Nation on Military Action against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan
and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
pubpapers/.
181. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action against Terrorist
Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 21, 1998), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/.

2006]

WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW TIGHTROPE

35

President Clinton invoked the traditional Caroline requirements of
imminence, necessity, and proportionality, claiming that all three had
been met.182 Indeed, when Bill Richardson, then U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, wrote the letter notifying the UN Security Council of the
U.S. missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, he clearly laid out the
U.S. arguments in support of the attacks in the familiar language of selfdefence.183 Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, went
further by warning terrorist organizations that the United States would
not limit itself to “passive defense” when faced with choosing either to
“fight or fold in pathetic cowardice . . . . ”184
Many of the same critiques of the Reagan Administration’s bombing of
Libya in 1986 were lodged at the Clinton Administration’s cruise missile
attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan, and many observers concluded that
the cruise missile attacks violated the rules of international law.185
Indeed, one commentator suggested that the Clinton Administration
foresaw this criticism: “The care with which . . . President [Clinton] and
U.S. officials characterized the justification for the missile attacks

182. See id. at 1464.
183. Ambassador Richardson’s letter to the President of the UN Security Council,
dated August 20, 1998, stated in part:
These attacks were carried out only after repeated efforts to convince the
Government of Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these
terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation with the bin laden
organization. That organization has issued a series of blatant warnings that
‘strikes will continue from everywhere’ against American targets, and we have
convincing evidence that further such attacks were in preparation from these
same terrorist facilities. The United States, therefore, had no choice but to use
armed force to prevent these attacks from continuing. In doing so, the United
States has acted pursuant to the right of self-defence confirmed by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations. The targets struck, and the timing and
method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of collateral
damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including the rules of
necessity and proportionality.
Reisman, supra note 176, at 48–49 (quoting Letter from Bill Richardson, the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (Aug. 20,
1998)).
184. Scheideman, supra note 177, at 250.
185. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The
Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 557 (1999) (“the August 20
missile strikes represent the assertion of imperial might and arrogance [by the United
States] in opposition to international law”).
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show[ed] their concern that the actions of the United States could be
perceived as a violation of international law.”186
In characterizing the cruise missile strikes as “retaliation rather than
legitimate self-defense,”187 critics took issue with the fact that the targets
of the attacks in both Afghanistan and Sudan had no direct link to any
“imminent” attack against the United States.188 Furthermore, it was
unlikely that the destruction of the terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan, and the leveling of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, met
the proportionality requirement regulating uses of force in selfdefence.189 Thus, no matter how the Clinton Administration chose to
justify the attacks—whether as retaliation or as self-defence—the
equation simply did not add up to an acceptable use of force under
international law.190 Most notably,
this is the first time the U.S. has given such primary and public
prominence to the preemptive, not just retaliatory, nature and motive of
a military strike against a terrorist organization or network. This may
be signaling a more proactive and global counter-terrorism policy, less
191
constrained in targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure.

In a warning to terrorist groups who may seek weapons of mass
destruction, President Clinton cited past efforts by the Al Qaeda terrorist
network to acquire chemical and other dangerous weapons as one of the
reasons for the U.S. attack. The Clinton Administration had not only
declared war on terror, but had also laid down the framework which the
George W. Bush Administration would take to the next level in the
aftermath of the September 11th attacks.
A. September 11, 2001: Crossing the Rubicon?
In a coordinated operation, whose breadth and audacity stunned the
world, terrorists believed to be part of the Al Qaeda network carried out
the worst terrorist attack in modern times, targeting various symbols of

186. See Brennan, supra note 178, at 1197.
187. Id. at 1210.
188. Id. at 1209–10.
189. See Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the
Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1095 (2000).
190. Id. at 1096. (“If the purpose of the strikes was retaliatory, it contravened
conventional international law. If the strikes were motivated by self-defence, it appears
that the necessary elements [an armed attack, necessity, immediacy, and proportionality]
were not present.”).
191. Perl, supra note 175.
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U.S. supremacy and leaving over 3,000 people dead.192 The day after the
attacks, the UN Security Council tersely stated that “[t]he magnitude of
[the] acts goes beyond terrorism as we have known it so far . . . . We
therefore think that new definitions, terms and strategies have to be
developed for the new realities.”193 On the same day, the UN General
Assembly, at its first plenary meeting of the year, adopted Resolution
56/1 without a vote, urgently calling for international cooperation to
prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism and stressing that those
responsible for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators,
organizers, and sponsors of such acts would be held accountable.194
Nine days later, on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush
pledged: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped, and defeated.”195 The UN Security Council agreed with
President Bush on the urgent need to fight terrorism.196 In addition, every
major regional organization, including the Arab League, agreed that the
September 11th hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center and
Penta gon were acts of terrorism in violation of international law.197

192. Four commercial aircraft were hijacked, two of them were flown into the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, causing both buildings to collapse.
A third aircraft crashed into the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia, which houses
the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defence and the U.S. armed forces. The
fourth aircraft crashed near Somerset, Pennsylvania. See RAPHAEL PERL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 1, 3 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports
(order code IB95112).
193. Valeriy Kuchinsky, Ukrainian Representative to the United Nations Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 3–4,U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (2001).
194. G.A. Res. 56/1, ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/49
(Sept. 12, 2001).
195. Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001), available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/ [hereinafter Response].
196. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
197. The UN General Assembly condemned the attacks as illegal and criminal acts of
terrorism. G.A. Res. 56/160, ¶ 3, U.N. GOAR, 56th Sess., 88th plen. mtg., Agenda Item
119b, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (Dec. 19, 2001). The Security Council condemned the
attacks “as a threat to international peace and security.” S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196.
The Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Organization of American
States, Association of South East Asian Nations, Organization of African Unity, and
Arab League also agreed that the hijacking of American passenger airliners by al Qaeda
terrorists was criminal. See e.g., Colin Powell, A Long, Hard Campaign, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 15, 2001, at 53.
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UN Security Resolution 1368, passed a day after the September 11th
attacks, unequivocally condemned the attacks, calling on all states to
“work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers
and sponsors”198 of the attacks, and thus reaffirmed the inherent right of
self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.199 The
U.S. right of self-defence was often mentioned in the same breath as the
terrorist attacks. “Given the circumstances, this affirmation was
significant: it implied that the attacks triggered the right even if, at the
time of adoption, the UN Security Council knew almost nothing about
who or what had launched them.”200
The shift in the law of pre-emption was evident. The international
response to retaliatory military strikes made by Israel against Tunisia in
1985 had been strongly condemnatory, despite Israel’s argument that
Tunisia’ s acts of harboring, supplying, and assisting non-state actors who
they claimed committed terrorist acts in Israel should be sufficient to
attribute the acts to the state.201 Notwithstanding Israel’s claims of selfdefence, in Resolution 573 the Security Council condemned the 1985 air
attack on PLO headquarters as an “act of armed aggression . . . in
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law
and norms of conduct.”202 The fact that Resolution 573 condemned
Israel’s attack as contrary to the UN Charter implied that no justification
based on self-defence was recognized. Subsequently, the claim of selfdefence was also rejected by states as justification for the U.S. bombing
of Tripoli and the 1993 bombing of the Iraqi Secret Service.203 The
inter national response to the September 11th attack was an important
departure from the reasoning in Resolution 573.
Amidst a swell of international support, the United States quickly
identified the Al Qaeda terrorist network, with the support of the Taliban
198. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196, at ¶ 3.
199. Id. at preamble.
200. Nicholas Rostow, Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism
since September 11th, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 475, 481 (2001).
201. Admittedly, the situation differs in exact factual circumstances from the
September 11th attacks, but does reflect the general stance of the international
community prior to that event. The Security Council was obviously faced with a situation
that profoundly differs from the previous incidents where there were limited casualties.
202. S.C. Res. 573 U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985). See generally Marian Nash
Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM.
J. INT’L L. 151, 165–67 (1986) (discussing the UN Security Council’s condemnation of
Israel’s air attack).
203. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11
September, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 407 (2002).
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government, as the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks.204 This
was coupled with the recognition that the modern threat to U.S. power
and security rises not from one particular organization, but from the
growing threat of international terrorism, particularly terrorism that
enjoys active or tacit state support.205 The Security Council’s resolutions
following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan explicitly mention the right of
individual and collective self-defence and do not contain any
condemnation of the military strikes.206
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan signaled a renewed
determination on the part of the United States to combat international
terrorism and states that sponsor it; the operation laid fertile ground for
debate on the strategic or legal approach that states should adopt in
responding to such threats. Strategically, the U.S. military action was
based on the “Reagan Doctrine” of swift and effective retribution against
terrorist organizations that strike U.S. interests,207 as well as the “Shultz
Doctrine” of active military engagement of terrorists and states that
sponsor or support them. Though legally, the U.S. justified “Operation
Enduring Freedom” under the established doctrine of self-defence,208 talk
from Washington suggested pre-emptive self-defence.
Essentially, the United States did not consider military action against
Afghanistan as a formal war against the state but pre-emption of further
attacks by terrorists based in that state. As the United States moved
against Afghanistan, the highest levels of military, legal, and diplomatic
policymakers in Washington began debating how the country should
confront states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate weapons of mass
destruction. The immediate focus of the debate was U.S. policy towards

204. See Response, supra note 195, at 1140 (“The evidence we have gathered all
points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaeda.”).
205. The war on terror “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped, and defeated . . . . From this day forward, any nation that continues
to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”
Response, supra note 195, at 1141–42.
206. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452nd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1390 (2002); S.C. Res. 1401, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4501st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1401 (2002).
207. See Crelinsten & Schmid, supra note 15, at 307, 316. The policy described by
Crelinsten and Schmid has clearly been continued by Reagan’s successors. This is
evident in Clinton’s air strikes against Iraq for the attempted assassination of George
H.W. Bush and his strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan following the embassy
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.
208. For a discussion of the international legal validity of U.S. military action
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan, see Beard, supra note 173, at 559.
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Iraq. Soon after the military action in Afghanistan, President Bush
provoked heated reaction with his “Axis of Evil” speech209 and its strong
overtones of the use of unilateral military action by the United States
against countries that support terror, and an intimation of expanding the
theatre of operations beyond Afghanistan without Security Council
approval. 210
B. The“ Bush Doctrine”
Though the genesis of the “Bush Doctrine” can be traced to the
immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks,211 it was five months
after the “Axis of Evil” speech, on June 1, 2001, that President Bush
delivered the fullest exposition of the doctrine in a speech at West
Point.212 Warning that the United States faced “a threat with no
precedent” through the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the emergence of global terrorism, President Bush stated that the
traditional strategies of deterrence and containment were no longer
sufficient.213 Because of the new threats that the United States faced, he
claimed that a proper understanding of the right of self-defence would
now extend to authorizing pre-emptive attacks against potential
aggressors, cutting them off before they are able to launch devastating
strikes.214 Under these circumstances, he concluded that “[i]f we wait for
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”215 Expounding
on the strategic aspect of the doctrine, President Bush stated that there
was a need to “take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and
confront the worst threats before they emerge.”216 In the same address, he
went on to tell future U.S. military officers at West Point that “[t]he
military must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner
of the world. All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a
price.”217 That doctrine carried an explicit warning for Iraq and other

209. George W. Bush, President of the United States, 2002 State of the Union Address
(Jan.
29,
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
210. See id.
211. Nine days after the attacks, U.S. President George Bush announced the new
aggressive national policy towards terrorism. See Response, supra note 195, at 1141–42.
212. See West Point Commencement Address, supra note 16.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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states that pursue weapons of mass destruction: if a hostile regime
pursues the acquisition or development of chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons, the decisive use of pre-emptive military force is a
legitimate response.
President Bush spent months building the case for war against Iraq,
however his justifications were often confusing and long on rhetoric but
short on substance. His primary argument, however, invoked a sweeping
new foreign policy based on the right of the U.S. to pre-emptive selfdefence, the need to punish Iraq for not complying with the Security
Council resolutions to which it had agreed in exchange for an end to the
Gulf War, and the need for massive retaliation.218 President Bush seemed
unsure of the exact contours of his doctrine, tying up pre-emptive strikes
with retaliation (which the author avers falls under the rubric of peace
time reprisal).
Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—
means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or
citizen to defend . . . . Containment is not possible when unbalanced
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons
or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies . . . . If we wait for
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited for too long . . . . In the
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.
And this nation will act.219

Though the more modest argument of retaliation may have been the
strongest, the U.S. response was increasingly articulated more firmly in
favor of anticipatory self-defence. The National Security Strategy
document, issued by President Bush in September 2002, asserted:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer
an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal
scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of
pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a
visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack
....

218. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the United
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relases/2002/09/print/20020912-1.html);
President
George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President (Apr. 123, 2004) (transcript available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relases/2004/04/print/40040413-20.html).
219. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16, at 15 (emphasis added).
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The U.S. has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if
necessary, act pre-emptively.220

The National Security Strategy document referred to the longstanding
policy as an option, not a principle.221 Interestingly though, the UN
Charter, the centre point of the legal framework on the international use
of force, was not mentioned, and no attempt was made to anchor the
formal articulation of the option within the umbrella of the Charter.
Despite the United States’ maneuverings while formulating a postSeptember 11th security strategy, it had Iraq firmly in its sights. The
United States and its allies continued to put forward what even then was
regarded by many as faulty intelligence,222 in an attempt to link Iraq to
the September 11th attacks.223 Before the war, despite international and

220. See id.
221. Id. at 15.
222. Dana Priest, U.S. Not Claiming Iraqi Link to Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002,
at A1 (reporting that CIA analysts are unable to validate allegations that the Iraqi
gov ernment has ties to Al Qaeda); Walter Pincus, No Link Between Hijacker, Iraq Found,
U.S. Says, WASH. POST, May 1, 2002, at A9; KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING
STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ xxi–xxiii (2002); see also JOHN KAMPFNER,
BLAIR’S WARS (2003); No 10 Denies Straw Had War Doubts, GUARDIAN (London), Sept.
15, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1042511,00.html; Matthew Tempest,
Hoon Regrets “Misunderstanding,” GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 11, 2003, available at
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1039958,00.html
(alleging
that
documents used to bolster the United States’ claims that Iraq presented a nuclear threat
were crudely-forged documents relating to Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Niger).
223. Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted that he was unaware of any “smoking
gun” linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks. Notwithstanding Powell’s admission,
President Bush and other senior U.S. government officials continued to rally around
questionable intelligence. They sheepishly admitted months later, after the war in Iraq
was officially over, what most states suspected all along—there was no link between Iraq
and the September 11th attacks. Bill Keller, The World According to Colin Powell, N. Y.
TIMES MAG. Nov. 25, 2001, at 61. On September 17, 2003, President Bush stated that
there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, disputing an idea held by many Americans. This came a day after
his hawkish Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said he had not seen any evidence that
Saddam was involved in the attacks. The National Security Adviser came out in support
of the Bush and Rumsfeld sentiments, saying “[w]e have never claimed that Saddam
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domestic skepticism, the hawkish Bush Administration had already
decided that the tragic events of September 11th had altered the context
of the United States-Iraq confrontation.224 The resulting U.S. shift to an
aggressive Iraq policy forced it to advance rather dubious legal
justifications for a full-scale invasion. Relying on the multifaceted “Bush
Doctrine,” the policy advocates pre-emptive or preventive strikes against
terrorists, states that support terrorists, and hostile states possessing
weapons of mass destruction.
The U.S.’s new aggressive anti-terror campaign began with
multilateral condemnation of terrorism. The United States and the United
Kingdom successfully encouraged the UN Security Council to pass
Resolution 1441,225 which gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with
its disarmament obligations through weapons inspections. Impatient with
the slow pace of the UN weapon’s inspection process, the United States
soon assumed evidence of Iraqi involvement with terrorist activity and
that Iraqi capacity for weapons of mass destruction persisted.226
The U.S. national security officials were adamant in their commitment
to act fast and to act alone and increasingly balked at UN control over the
use of force against rogue states that present perceived security threats.227
The end-game of this debate was cemented by President Bush when he
announced that “the policy of [the U.S.] government is the removal of
Saddam [Hussein].”228 This announcement effectively cut off all future
multilateral activities with the UN.
Possibly, in light of the dubious intelligence linking Iraq to the
Septe mber 11th attacks, the United States cited Iraq’s capacity to use

Hussein had either direction or control of 9/11.” Greg Miller, No Proof Connects Iraq to
911, Bush Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/justify/2003/0918proof.htm.
224. POLLACK, supra note 222, at xxi–xxiii.
225. S.C. Res. 1441, 1, 13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). The UN Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441. The resolution declares Iraq to be in
material breach of its obligations under past UN mandates. It also informs Iraq it will face
“serious consequences” if it fails to cooperate. It is questionable whether it authorises a
member-state to unilaterally take action in the event of further non-compliance.
226. Much debate abounds about the credibility of the U.S. evidence regarding Iraq’s
links to Al Qaeda. The issue of the possession of weapons of mass destruction, the
quantity and nature is yet another controversy. Admittedly, it is difficult to conclude one
way or the other but what stands out is the fact that the international community remained
divided over the matter right up to the day of military action.
227. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16.
228. Allies Discuss Terrorism and the Middle East: Bush and Blair on Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at A14.
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weapons of mass destruction as an additional justification for selfdefensive anticipatory intervention against Iraq.229 Self-defence, it was
suggested, also fueled the need for internal “regime change” in Iraq and
U.S. support of such change.230 In March 2003, without waiting for the
UN Security Council to declare Iraq in breach of Resolution 1441 and,
thus, a threat to international peace and security for which the Council
could explicitly authorize military intervention,231 the United States and
its allies proceeded with military action against Iraq premised on preemptive or anticipatory self-defence. The technologically superior U.S.
army waged a highly-organized, technical “shock and awe” campaign
that impressed an otherwise angry international community, and drove
Saddam Hussein out of power.232 The war against Iraq was to be the
defining moment in the evolution of the “Bush Doctrine,” marking a
growing coherence and confidence in the strategy of “offensive defense.”
Despite the United States’ focus on pre-emptive intervention, the
action against Iraq and the United States’ subsequent occupation was
undertaken against a background of vehement opposition from a large
section of the international community, including some major powers.233
If Afghanistan had set the stage for the evolution of anticipatory selfdefence, the over breadth of the U.S. action in Iraq action dismantled it.
The regime on force does not support the operationalisation of preemptive self-defence against Iraq as it did in Afghanistan, and the
circumstances surrounding U.S. intervention in Iraq differ fundamentally
from those in Afghanistan. The United States did not conclusively prove
229. Traditionally, anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence has not been favoured
under international law. See Byers, supra note 203, at 410. However, the notion of preemptive “counter-proliferation” forms an important part of the new U.S. national security
strategy. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16.
230. The United States affirmed it would provide “‘lethal assistance’ in the form of
military training and arms to Iraqi opposition volunteers and Kurdish fighters in Iraq.”
Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Drafting Resolution to Impose Deadline on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A14; Julia Preston & Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: The
UN Diplomacy; U.S.-French Split on Iraq Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A1
(reporting that the CIA had begun covert operations in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq
with a view to fomenting an uprising in Iraq).
231. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. A plain reading of Resolution 1441, suggests that
there would be another UN Security Council meeting in the event of an Iraqi breach, at
least to discuss the inspectors’ report, at which point the use of force could be authorised.
On the other hand, the use of fuzzy and ambiguous language could be read as supporting
the notion that the Security Council is allowing individual states greater interpretive
latitude in deciding when force can be used.
232. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31,at 17.
233. Id. at 11.
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that Al Qaeda maintained Iraqi training bases or that it received financial,
logistic, or military support from the Iraqi government.234 The strategic
and legal calculus for action in Iraq did not compare favorably to that
which motivated U.S. action in Afghanistan in late 2001. Unlike the
questionable connection between Iraq and the September 11th attacks,
there were clear ties between the terrorists involved in the U.S. attacks
and the government of Afghanistan.235
Not surprisingly, military action against Iraq has split the international
community and inflamed the world’s major powers, as it raises both
policy and legal matters. Considering that the use of armed force can
only be justified under the international law regime when used in selfdefence, can the United States go beyond the rhetoric and actually carry
the war on terror to those rogue nations who are identified as supporters
and sponsors of terrorist activities, but have not physically engaged in an
act of aggression against the United States?236 The convergence of
international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction presents a grave
threat to international peace, security, and prosperity by threatening the
survival of entire nations. This threat multiplies exponentially when
go
v ernments foster and encourage these dual scourges. However, the
aggressive “Bush Doctrine” is disturbing because an old problem in
contemporary international law (anticipatory self-defence) is being
touted as a newly appropriate vehicle in the war against international
terrorism, despite the prevailing view in the international community that
the “armed attack” requirement in Article 51 of the UN Charter
superseded any pre-existing right of anticipatory action.
The old truism that “international law is not a suicide pact,” may be
forceful in “an age of uniquely destructive weaponry,”237 however,
“stra tegically, there is little precedent for a major U.S. military offensive
against a state that has not proximately used force against [the United
States].”238 While a number of legitimate justifications might permit the
use of force, the international legal system does not currently provide a
legal outlet for such force.239 “An international law doctrine, under which
234. Id. at 9.
235. Id. at 11.
236. See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era:
The “War on Terror,” 4S CHOLAR 209 (2001-02).
237. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During
Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 231, 239 (1992).
238. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at
14.
239. Id.
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the [United States] could execute the military campaign it successfully
launched against Iraq, does not currently exist. That lacuna was
seemingly plugged with the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ that advocates pre-emptive
strikes against rogue states and/or entities involved in terrorism.”240 The
Doctrine’s reliance on the premise of pre-emptive self-defence resurrects
the idea of a “right of self-preservation” that fell into disuse in the early
part of the twentieth century with the prohibition of war and the legal
demarcation of the limits of the right to self-defence outlined in the UN
Charter.241
C. Reflections on the Use of Force as a Counter-Terrorism Measure in
Light of the UN Charter
1. Armed Attack and Self-Defence
Contrary to the intentions of the authors of the UN Charter, the system
of collective security has been of little practical significance, and state
aggression continues to be determined by the unilateral use of force by
states.242 Commentators argue that, because the customary right of selfdefence includes action beyond armed attack, military force may be
legally available as an option against terrorists, even if an armed attack
has not occurred.
[a]lthough Article 51 refers to the right of self-defense “if an armed
attack occurs,” the United Kingdom and the United States have
consistently maintained that the right of self-defense also applies when
an armed attack has not yet taken place but is imminent. This view of
self-defense can be traced back to the famous Caroline incident of
243
1837.

This view holds that the presence of an armed attack is one of the bases
for the exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 51, but not the
exclusive basis.244 The sentiments of these commentators are also
reflected by some major states.245 In support of such an expansive
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 27, at 1620.
243. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 12 (2003).
244. See James P. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy
Analysis, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 159, 170– 71 (1986); Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633–34.
245. See Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11,
at 30–32 (“. . . Israel and the U.S. have been particularly notorious in seeking to rely upon
the concept of anticipatory self-defence on numerous occasions . . .”).
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interpretation of “armed attack,” certain international legal scholars
“believe that state sponsorship and support of international terrorists
constitutes a use of force contemplated by Article 2(4).”246 This is not an
entirely idle argument considering that the scope and content of the
prohibition of the use of force in contemporary international law cannot
be determined by an interpretation of Article 2(4) alone. Rather, the
provision must be read in context with Articles 39, 51, and 53. These
articles contain a number of terms that, though related to one another,
differ considerably in their meaning. Thus notions such as “use or threat
of force,” “threat to the peace,” “breach of the peace,” “act of
aggression,” “armed attack” and “aggressive policy” are used but do not
receive any further explanation in the Charter.247 Neither legal writing
nor state practice has clarified these terms beyond doubt. Nor have
attempts within the framework of the United Nations led to a satisfactory
interpretation. Therefore, there is still no sound basis for redefining the
Charter’s prohibition of the use of force.
State practice (albeit restricted to only a few states, notably the United
States and Israel) seems to support the view that terrorist bombings may
constitute an armed attack justifying self-defence under Article 51. For
example, the United States justified its cruise missile attack against
Sudan and Afghanistan following the 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya as an exercise of self-defence.248 The
United States has considered terrorist bombings to be armed attacks for
some time and has accordingly justified several U.S. military actions
against states that have supported terrorists.249
It is significant that the Security Council characterized the terrorist acts
as “armed attacks.”
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, it is also
necessary to ask whether the concept of “armed attack” in Article 51 of
the Charter is capable of including a terrorist attack . . . . There is,
however, no a priori reason why the term should be so confined. There

246. See RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATESPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 113 (1989).
247. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, arts. 39, 51, 53.
248. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51
of the UN Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 49– 50 (2002).
249. Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 46 (1989); see also Letter Dated April 14,
1986 From Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/17990
(1986).
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is no doubt that terrorist acts by a state can constitute an armed attack
and thereby justify a military response. The UN General Assembly
included certain types of terrorist activity committed by states in its
definition of aggression in 1974. Similarly, the International Court of
Justice, in its judgment in the Nicaragua case in 1986, considered that
covert military action by a state could be classified as an armed attack
if it was of sufficient gravity. The level of violence employed on
250
September 11, 2001 undoubtedly reached that level of gravity.

This view was expressly affirmed by other international bodies
including NATO and the OAS.251 This characterization may lead one to
conclude that:
The international reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 confirms
the commonsense view that the concept of armed attack is not limited
to state acts. The UN Security Council, in its resolutions 1368 and 1373
(2001), adopted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, expressly
recognized the right of self-defense in terms that could only mean it
considered that terrorist attacks constituted armed attacks for the
pur poses of Article 51 of the Charter, since it was already likely, when
these resolutions were adopted, that the attacks were the work of a
252
terrorist organization rather than a state.

By recognizing the “inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence” in the preambles of Reso lution 1368 and Resolution 1373, the
Security Council acknowledged that self-defence motivated the military
strikes against the Taliban in 2001. 253
Nothing in the language of Article 39 or the rest of the Charter suggests
that only threats emanating from states can fall within its scope. In
recent years, the Security Council has had no hesitation in treating acts
250. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 16–17.
251. North Atlantic Council, Statement on Collective Self Defense (Sept. 12, 2001),
available
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/sept_11/sept_11_archive/statem
ent_by_north_atlantic_council_on_collective_self-defense.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2006). The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, meeting in
consultation, likewise invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
in declaring that “these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks
against all American States.” Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OAS RC.24/Res.1/01 ¶ 1,
OEA/Ser.F/II.24
(Sept.
21,
2001),
available
at
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/rc.24e.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
252. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 17.
253. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196; G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(Sept. 28, 2001) (“reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368”).
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of international terrorism, whether or not “state-sponsored,” as threats
to the peace for the purposes of Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, even
before September 11, 2001, the Council had characterized as a threat to
254
international peace and security Libyan support for terrorism . . . .

The main question is how the events of September 11th affect the
interpretation of the “armed attack” requirement under the UN Charter.
Despite the assertion above, in the author’s view, the Security Council’s
statement implies that the difficult question of whether the terrorist
attacks constituted “armed attacks” depends on interpretation. As this
author has noted,
Resolution 1368 is ambiguous on the issue. In its preamble, Resolution
1368 “recogni[ses] the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense in accordance with the Charter,” but in the operative part of the
resolution describes the attacks as “terrorist attacks” (not armed
attacks) that “represent a threat to international peace and security.” In
summary, Resolution 1368 the resolution [sic] does not explicitly
recognise that the right of self-defense applies in relation to any parties
as a consequence of the September 11 attacks.255

Even if the right of self-defence extends beyond the “armed attack” of
Article 51, serious hurdles must be overcome before a traditional theory
of self-defence can be used to justify attacks against terrorists or terrorist
facilities located in another state. If the anticipated action by terrorists is
not sufficiently imminent, the right to use force is not available for
purposes of deterrence.256 Some argue that even if the right of selfdefence extends beyond the “armed attack” requirement of Article 51,
the UN Charter would not permit the use of force to punish an aggressor

254. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 19.
255. Jackson Maogoto, War on the Enemy: Self-Defense and State-Sponsored
Terrorism 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 406, 434 (2003). By “recognizing the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter,” the preambular
paragraph of Resolution 1368 appeared to imply that the terrorist acts in New York,
Washington, and Pennsylvania represented an “armed attack” within the meaning of
Article 51 of the UN Charter. A similar preambular paragraph was also included in
Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373, supra note 253.
256. Terry, supra note 244, at 171. In his article, Terry makes the point that, given the
rapid delivery capabilities of terrorist organisations, it is unrealistic to require that a state
wait until an attack is imminent before responding. The Israelis used similar arguments to
justify their attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak and these arguments were
rejected by the United Nations and the world community. See O’Brien, supra note 76, at
450–51.
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after a threat had passed, nor permit the use of force to deter a less than
imminent threat.257 In any case,
if past terrorist actions by a group are too remote in time, the response
by force is likely to be characterized as an illegal reprisal. It appears
that if a right to use force in self-defense exists apart from an armed
attack, it is a right that presents a very narrow window of opportunity.
In fact, this window of opportunity, under the traditional criteria for
self-defense, will almost never exist in the context of terrorist attacks.
The traditional requirements for self-defense are simply too restrictive
258
to reasonably respond to the threat posed by international terrorism.

2. Pre-emptive Self-Defence
Under customary international law, the right of self-defence was
judged by the standard first set out in the 1837 case of the Caroline,
which established the right of a state to take necessary and proportional
actions in anticipation of a hostile threat.259 Based on the Caroline
incident, anticipatory self-defence must be “necessary,” “proportional,”
and take place “immediately.”260 As noted elsewhere in this Article,
Article 51 of the UN Charter is generally taken as an authoritative
definition of the right of self-defence. However, scholars and states alike
have continued to debate whether the enactment of Article 51 subsumed
customary international law and extinguished the concept of anticipatory
self-defence, or whether it simply codified a right that continues to exist
257. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military
Force, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 145, 162 (2000).
258. Id. at 165–66.
259. 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409–14 (1906). The
“affair of the Caroline” involves a U.S. ship (“Caroline”) being used by U.S. citizens to
transport reinforcements to Canadian territory in support of insurgents battling Great
Britain’s rule. Id. at 409. A small British force crossed into U.S. territory and destroyed
the Caroline. Id. at 409–10.Great Britain defended its action on the grounds that it was a
necessary act of self-defence. Id. at 410. The case is illustrative of a state’s right to
undertake necessary actions in “anticipatory” self-defence of an impending, though not
necessarily imminent, hostile attack. Another case on point is the Corfu Channel Case
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9), which has been cited for the proposition that the
International Court of Justice recognised a residual right to reprisal remaining in the
international legal order, the Charter of the United Nations notwithstanding. Roda
Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifiable? A Comparative Survey, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 227, 252 (1987).
260. See Roberto Ago, Addendum to the 8th Report on State Responsibility (pt.1
concluded), [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 13, 68–9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5–7
(describing requirements frequently viewed as essential conditions for admissibility of
self-defence pleas).
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with all its attendant doctrines under customary international law. The
answer is in the interpretation.
Proponents of the continuing customary right to pre-emptive selfdefence have cited the impracticability of applying a literal interpretation
of Article 51 in an age of advanced weapons, delivery systems, and
heightened worldwide terrorist activity.261 Adherents argue the absurdity
of requiring a state to refrain from taking action on its own behalf when
an opposing state is preparing to launch an attack.262 Given the
devastating potential of modern weapons and the swiftness of delivery to
their intended targets, denying a state the right to act in advance of a
pending attack effectively denies any defence at all. The same rationale
applies to states threatened with impending terrorist attacks on their
citizenry or property.
Some scholars have noted that it cannot be supposed that the
inviolability of territory is so sacrosanct as to mean that a state may
harbor within its territory the most blatant preparation for an assault upon
another state’s independence with impunity; the inviolability of territory
is subject to the use of that territory in a manner which does not involve a
threat to the rights of other states.263 Further supporting this position is
that there is no literal requirement under Article 51 that a foreign
go
v ernment itself directly undertake the attack to which a state responds.
Thus, the harboring of terrorists may give rise to legitimate, legal
justification for anticipatory military intervention. Any such claim,
however, is still fundamentally one of self-defence, and still restricted by
threshold requirements, including imminence, necessity, and
proportionality.264
Some scholars have gone as far as to argue that a right of truly
anticipatory self-defence has emerged outside of Article 51, based not on
pre-existing customary law, but on the availability of weapons capable of

261. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31,at 30 –31.
262. See generally Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defence
(A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 25
(1987).
263. BOWETT, supra note 64, at 191–92; see also ERICKSON, supra note 245, at 109.
264. See Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi
Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 147 (1999).
Some scholars would further limit the right of anticipatory self-defence, adding, inter
alia, last resort, reasonableness, and a requirement of reporting to the UN Security
Council. See also ERICKSON, supra note 245, at 145–50.
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mass destruction.265 Thomas Franck accounts for the emergence of a
viable doctrine of anticipatory self-defence through
the transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and
instant destruction. These [weapons] brought into question the
conditionality of Article 51, which limits states’ exercise of the right of
self-defense to the aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first strike
266
capabilities begat a doctrine of “anticipatory self-defense” . . . .

Other scholars opine that in a nuclear age, there are potentially
devastating consequences for prohibiting self-defence unless an armed
attack has already occurred, leading states to prefer the interpretation
permitting anticipatory self-defence.267 Christopher Greenwood argues
further that,
this view accords better with state practice and with the realities of
modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation
of Article 51, which would confine the right of self-defense to cases in
268
which an armed attack had already occurred . . .

Greenwood goes on to undertake a critical analysis of “Operation
Enduring Freedom” against the benchmarks of “necessity,”
“proportionality” and “imminence.” He notes that,
[t]he pre-emptive action that the United States and its allies took
against Al- Qaeda in Afghanistan was . . . a lawful exercise of the right
of self-defense. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that selfdefense would cover every military action that the United States or an
ally might want to take against Al-Qaeda (or other terrorist groups) in
other countries. The use of force in Afghanistan fell within the concept
of self-defense because the threat from Al-Qaeda was imminent and
because Afghanistan was quite openly affording sanctuary to large
numbers of Al-Qaeda personnel. These considerations will not
269
necessarily be present in every case.

There are, of course, debates as to whether “Operation Enduring
Freedom” met the benchmark of proportionality. The U.S. case is not
helped by calls for “regime change” in relation to rogue states which the
United States is keen to put out of business, especially when they seek to
265. BOWETT, supra note 64, at 191–92; see also ERICKSON, supra note 246, at 142–
43.
266. Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without
Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 51, 57–58 (2001).
267. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 15.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 25.
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develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction. Assuming for the
moment that the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan simply altered the
balance of power in the civil war, when we juxtapose “Operation
Enduring Freedom” against “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” significant legal
questions are left open. As Michael J. Kelly notes,
[u]nilaterally, the United States articulated its right to act preemptively
to eliminate the threat posed by a potentially nuclear-armed Iraq.
However, because the existence of an imminent threat could not be
established, when the president brought the old anticipatory selfdefense doctrine back to life, he eliminated that threshold and replaced
270
it with the showing of only an “emerging” threat.

Kelly further avers that, in the absence of a link between Iraq and Al
Qaeda, the United States sought a doctrine that would legitimize an
attack on Baghdad.271 Considering that
a plain reading of Article 51 disallows striking Iraq absent an armed
attack, the Bush Administration is required to return to the legal history
books and pull out another disused doctrine to justify any unilateral
military action it may take. The one that seems to fit best, albeit
272
imper fectly, is the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.

Notwithstanding the allure of a policy of anticipatory self-defence,
there is little basis for such an extension of the UN Charter’s right to selfdefence. In justifying its attacks on Iraq, the United States relied on the
concept of anticipatory self-defence, while seeking to dilute the Charter’s
prohibition with customary international law. UN Charter aside, there is
no basis in international law to support the doctrine of “pre-emption”
encompassing a right to respond to threats that might materialize at some
time in the future. The test is clear—imminence, which connotes
immediacy, is required to trigger self-defensive actions. A broad right of
anticipatory self-defence premised on a new standard of “emerging
threat” would introduce dangerous uncertainties relating to the
determination of potential threats justifying pre-emptive action. With this
determination being state-based, the probability of opportunistic
interventions justified as anticipatory self-defence will rise. After all, the
reality is that only states with the military muscle will be able to make
use of this avenue and unilateral action will inevitably be colored by
national interest considerations. The development of such a right will

270. Kelly, supra note 87, at 2.
271. Id. at 22.
272. Id.
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likely prompt potential targets into striking first—to use rather than lose
their biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
3. Reprisals
With regard to reprisals, the text of the UN Charter represents a
conventional rejection of the just-war theories of retribution abandoned
in the seventeenth century. 273 The purpose of the United Nations is to
limit the use of force in international matters and to provide a forum for
the resolution of conflict so as to prevent the need for war. In the history
of the United Nations, there have been authoritative condemnations of
both pre-emptive and retaliatory reprisal actions.274 It seems safe to
conclude that both are widely expected to be inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations and are, therefore, proscribed under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Previous military actions by the United States against terroristsupporting states elicited varying responses from the international
community and the United Nations. In the case of the 1986 raid on
Libya, the United States was largely condemned.275 The UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the United States for the
attack by a vote of 79 to 28, with 33 abstentions.276 The UN Secretary
General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, stated that the U.S. action violated
international law.277 Though a UN Security Council resolution echoing
the General Assembly’s sentiment was vetoed by the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, France did call the air strikes “reprisals

273. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter states: “All members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para.
4.
274. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 188, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/188 (Apr. 9, 1964); S.C. Res. 316,
¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/316 (June 26, 1972). See also Richard Falk, The Decline of
Normative Restraint in International Relations, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 263, 266–67 (1985).
See generally Geoffrey M. Levitt, International Law and the U.S. Government’s
Response to Terrorism, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 755 (1986).
275. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at
34.
276. G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 34, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986).
277. Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Bombing Baghdad, Revisited: Lawful Self-Defense
or Unlawful Reprisal? CONN. L. TRIB., July 19, 1993, at 24.
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that itself revives the chain of violence.”278 In contrast, the United States’
1993 cruise missile attack on Baghdad in response to the foiled Iraqi
assassination attempt on former President Bush was met with support or
tacit acquiescence.279 In response to the U.S. presentation before the UN
Security Council, the representatives of other member states either
expressed support for the U.S. action or refrained from criticizing it; only
China questioned the attack.280 The General Assembly took no action.
Five years after the cruise missile attacks on Baghdad, world reaction
to the 1998 U.S. strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan
was mixed. Western European nations supported the U.S. actions to
varying degrees, while Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared he was
“outraged” by the “indecent” behavior of the United States.281 China
issued an ambiguous statement condemning terrorism, and Japan said it
“understood [America’s] resolute attitude towards terrorism.”282
The aforementioned incidents were wrapped up in the rhetoric of selfdefence and retaliation, leading to the observation that, although the
prevailing view is that reprisals are illegal, states may still engage in
them.
For example, the 1986 bombing of Libya is cited as a peacetime
reprisal and not an act of self-defense. Therefore, while writers state
emphatically that reprisals are illegal, state practice continues to resort
to them on occasion, cloaking them in terms of self-defense while
283
remaining careful to comply with Naulilaa criteria.

V. CONCLUSION
The international community has long been uneasy with the use of
military action as a counter-measure against terrorism. In 1986, when the
United States bombed Libya in response to a terrorist act, President
Reagan called the action “pre-emptive” on the ground that there was

278. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 182, 187 (1987).
279. See Stephen Robinson, UN Support for Raid on Baghdad, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), June 28, 1993, at 1; Craig R. Whitney, European Allies Are Giving Strong
Backing to U.S. Raid: Arab Governments Critical, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A7.
280. Stanley Meisler, UN Reaction Mild as U.S. Explains Raid, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
1993, at A1.
281. Phil Reeves, Outraged Yeltsin Denounces “Indecent” U.S. Behavior,
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 22, 1998, at 2.
282. See id.
283. Kelly, supra note 87, at 13.

56

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

already a pattern of Libyan terrorist actions.284 The justification did not
go over well with the international community. Roughly a decade later,
in 1998, after terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
the United States fired cruise missiles on Sudan and Afghanistan.285
President Clinton argued that there was compelling evidence that the Al
Qaeda terrorist network was planning to mount further attacks against
Americans, and he was thereafter entitled to act.286 Apart from a few
western governments, which approved or kept quiet, most states
condemned the Clinton air strikes.287 Conversely, the 2001 U.S. bombing
of Afghanistan was widely supported by the international community.
But in 2003, when the United States launched military action against
Iraq, it did so against a background of protests from a large section of the
inter national community, “squandering away the legal and moral capital
it had gained in the action against Afghanistan.”288
The attacks of September 11th, the response by the United States, and
the international community’s approval of the military action in
Afghanistan represent a new paradigm in international law relating to the
use of force. Previously, acts of terrorism were seen as criminal acts,
carried out by private, non-governmental entities.289 In contrast, the
September 11th attacks were regarded as an act of war.290 This
effectively marked a turning point in the long-standing premise in
international law that force, aggression, and armed attacks are
instruments of relations between states.291 Terrorism was no longer
merely a serious threat to peace and stability to be combated through
domestic and international penal mechanisms; use of force was now seen
as an attractive and satisfying counter-measure in managing terrorism.
However, subsequent U.S. military action in Iraq was shrouded in
confusing legal justifications and questionable, even faulty evidence.
284. Reagan: We Have Done What We Had to Do, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at
A23.
285. Beard, supra note 173, at 562.
286. See Arthur Brice, Terror Suspect Says Now It’s War, U.S. Ready, Says Official:
“We’re Going to be on the Offence as Well as Defence”, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 22,
1998, at A1.
287. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at 32.
288. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31,at 14.
289. Maogoto, War on the Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra
note 255, at 431.
290. Id. at 431, 433.
291. Davis Brown, Use of Force against Terrorism after September 11th: State
Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2
(2003).
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This has raised skepticism among scholars and the international
community that self-defence was used and misused, thus preventing the
evolution of any meaningful state practice.
As a result of the United States’ aggressive policy, certain discarded
pre-UN Charter doctrines are being revived in one form or the other,
notably the concept of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence. Some
critics have warned against the inherent dangers of resurrecting such preCharter doctrines, noting that:
One of the very reasons the world community decided to do away with
them was to reduce legal justifications for, and thus the possibility of,
unilateral military action. The pre-Charter doctrines were used
erratically and unreliably prior to 1945. Now, if these doctrines are
returned to service by the world’s superpower and are allowed to pass
into customary practice once again, we will find ourselves in a time
warp back to 1945—a period of fear, uncertainty and suspicion; a
period of global dominance by a handful of nations; a period defined by
the geopolitics of raw power and militaristic influence; a period of
instability devoid of collective security. Even more disturbingly, some
of the re-articulated rules have been watered down to allow more
292
latitude in unilateral action.

However in a spirited defence of pre-emptive action, other scholars
assert that: “[w]aiting for an aggressor to fire the first shot may be a
fitting code for television westerns, but it is unrealistic for policy-makers
entrusted with the solemn responsibility of safe-guarding the well-being
of their citizenry.”293 However, these critics are missing the central
point—when military action is undertaken, things get real—real bombs,
real missiles, real deaths. Unilateral state sponsored military action must
not be based on mere apprehension backed by dubious or unclear
intelligence. Once the military action is over it cannot be unmade by
commissions of inquiries or concessions that perhaps a few facts were
overstated. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in remarks regarding
anticipatory self-defence during the opening of the 58th session of the
UN General Assembly in September 2003, summed up the dilemma
thus:
Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain the
inherent right of self-defense. But until now it has been understood that

292. Kelly, supra note 87, at 3.
293. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 552
(2002).
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when States go beyond that, and decide to use force to deal with
broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique
294
legitimacy provided by the United Nations.

Annan concluded that in light of the reality of weapons of mass
destruction “[w]e have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment
no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was
founded.”295
The UN Charter seems to present a neat and tidy regime on the use of
force. Nonetheless it reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a
political system to govern conflicts between states and does not directly
address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in the postWorld War II period.296 The drafters did not contemplate the existence of
international terrorists nor “fully anticipate the existence, tenacity and
technology of modern day terrorism.”297 In view of the fact that terrorist
groups appear to have reached a global sophistication, there is little doubt
that international terrorism presents a threat with which traditional
theories for the use of military force are inadequate to deal, and were
unanticipated when the UN Charter was drafted.298 The international
community has no option but to develop new strategies within the rubric
of international law to deal with terrorism and the reality that
international law seems to restrict the use of military force to actions in
self-defence.

294. Press Release, General Assembly, Adoption of Policy of Pre-Emption Could
Result in Proliferation of Unilateral, Lawless Use of Force, Secretary-General Tells
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8891/GA/10157 (Sept. 23, 2003),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8891.doc.htm.
295. Id.
296. See Albert R. Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297, 307 (1987) (“The self-defense provisions
of the UN Charter, crafted in 1945 with a view to the kinds of open, conventional
aggression that triggered World War II, does not address directly the subtler modes of
international violence characteristic of the 1980s.”).
297. Baker, supra note 262, at 25.
298. Id.; see also Wallace F. Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion under
International Law: A Legal Analysis of the United States Raid on Libya on April 14,
1986, 37 NAVAL L. REV. 49, 64–70 (1988).

